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“LIKE A WITHERED TREE, STRIPPED OF ITS FOLIAGE”: 
WHAT THE ROE COURT MISSED AND WHY IT MATTERS
J. SHOSHANNA EHRLICH*
INTRODUCTION
The Legislature finds that pregnant women contemplating the termination 
of their right to their relationship with their unborn children . . . are faced 
with making a profound decision most often under stress and pressures 
 . . . and that there exists a need for special protection of the rights of such 
pregnant women . . . .1
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the 
mother has for her child. The [Partial Birth Abortion] Act recognizes this 
reality . . . it seems unexceptional to conclude that some women come to 
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. 
Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow. 2
In 1973 in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court faced a constitutional 
challenge to a criminal abortion statute from the state of Texas, which, like the laws in 
effect in a majority of states, prohibited abortion unless a doctor determined the procedure 
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1   RepoRt of the South Dakota taSk foRce to StuDy aboRtion 5 (2005) (quoting H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg. 
Assemb., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005), in which the Legislature set out a “woman-protective” rationale for the Task 
Force). For a detailed discussion of the Task Force, see Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, infra note 15, at 1651–57. 
2   Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
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was necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman.3 Relying on a line of cases dating back 
to 1923 in which it had recognized a constitutional right of privacy with regard to “personal 
rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’”— 
such as the choice of a marriage partner, the use of contraceptives, and the raising of one’s 
children—the Court held that the “Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty 
and restrictions upon state action . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.”4
In locating the right to abortion within this constitutional zone of privacy, the Roe 
Court focused on “[t]he detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman 
by denying this choice.”5 Of particular relevance in the present context, in addition to 
identifying the risk of “medically diagnosable” harms, the Court zeroed in on the potential 
psychological and emotional risks of carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful 
life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and 
physical health may be taxed by childcare. There is also the distress, 
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the 
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable psychologically 
and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional 
difficulties and stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.6
3   Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). By the time the case reached the Court, about one-third of the states 
had liberalized their existing criminal law. Most of these states followed the route of relaxing the strict “life-
saving” therapeutic exception in favor of also permitting abortion in other circumstances, such as in cases of 
rape, incest, or serious fetal anomalies, while a distinct minority opted for outright repeal of their criminal bans 
up through a designated point in pregnancy. Id. at 139 n.37. 
The push for reform came mainly from professionals, most notably physicians, public health advocates, 
and lawyers who were largely motivated by concerns for the devastating impact of criminal abortion laws on 
the health of women as well as the risk to doctors of prosecution for pushing the boundaries of the therapeutic 
exception, while the drive for repeal reflected the emerging feminist demand that women had a right to control 
their own bodies. See LinDa GReenhouSe & Reva b. SieGeL, befoRe Roe v. WaDe: voiceS that ShapeD the 
aboRtion Debate befoRe the SupReme couRt RuLinG (2012); LaWRence h. tRibe, aboRtion: the cLaSh of 
abSoLuteS 34–49 (1992). 
4   Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53.
5   Id. at 153.
6   Id. (emphasis added).
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In short, as seen by the Court, the primary harm of a strict criminal antiabortion regime 
was its power to foist motherhood upon a woman who was not ready or able to assume 
responsibility for a child at a particular moment in her life. 
However sympathetic the Court may have been to the plight of a woman facing an 
unplanned pregnancy, it also made clear that the right to abortion was not absolute and 
must be “considered against important [state] interests in regulation”; namely, protecting 
the health of the pregnant woman and the potentiality of life.7 Aware of the “sensitive and 
emotional nature” of this balancing task given the “vigorous opposing views . . . and the 
deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject [of abortion] inspires,” the Court 
committed itself to “resolv[ing] the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion 
and predilection.”8
 Reflecting its “earnest” determination to resolve the case in this manner, at the outset 
of the opinion, the Court announced its intention to inquire into and “place some emphasis 
upon medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about man’s attitudes 
towards the abortion procedure . . . .”9 In its review of the history behind the “criminal 
abortion laws in effect in a majority of states today,” the Court stressed that these laws were 
“of relatively recent vintage” having derived from “statutory changes effected, for the most 
part, in the latter half of the 19th century,” as the result of an active campaign by medical 
professionals.10 
In examining the “significant role” that the medical profession played in the “enactment 
of stringent criminal abortion legislation during that period,”11 the Court focused on the 
7   Id. at 154–55. The Court ultimately settled upon its now famous trimester formulation as a way to 
accommodate the tension between a woman’s right to privacy and these countervailing state interests. In brief, 
during the first trimester, the Court held that neither state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify limitations 
on the abortion right; in the second trimester, when the procedure potentially is riskier, the state’s interest in the 
protection of health becomes compelling so as to permit regulations aimed at insuring the safety of the abortion 
procedure; and in the third trimester, the state’s interest in the protection of fetal life is deemed sufficiently 
compelling so as to permit the criminalization of abortion unless necessary to protect the health or life of the 
pregnant woman. Id. at 163–65.
8   Id. at 116.
9   The Court’s review extends as far back as the ancient Greeks and Romans; however, our focus is limited 
to its discussion of the evolution of abortion laws in the United States. Id. at 116–17.
10   Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
11   Id. at 141.
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commitment of physicians to the protection of the unborn. Accordingly, its discussion of 
this history leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the nation’s criminal abortion 
laws were enacted with the singular aim of halting “such unwarrantable destruction of 
human life.”12 Although this may well have been a goal of the physicians’ activism,13 this 
reading of the historical record fails to tell the whole story behind their campaign as it 
elides the interwoven gendered and racialized tropes that they regularly invoked in support 
of their goal of making abortion a strict statutory crime. Critically in this regard, not even 
a careful read of the decision offers a hint that the physicians were seeking to manage the 
reproductive conduct of the married middle-class woman in order to preserve both the 
gendered domestic order and the racial character of the nation.
At first glance, this omission may not seem particularly significant. After all, the abortion 
battle has largely been waged over the legal and moral status of the fetus. Accordingly, the 
Court’s recitation of the historical purpose of the nation’s antiabortion laws has neatly 
meshed with the ongoing debate over the role the law should play in protecting fetal life. 
However, as the above-quoted passages from the Report of the South Dakota Task Force 
to Study Abortion and the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart respectively 
demonstrate, the antiabortion movement no longer simply opposes abortion “because all 
human life is sacred.”14 Rather, over the past few decades, this claim has been augmented, if 
not supplanted, by the increasingly widespread assertion that abortion should be restricted 
in order to protect women from emotional trauma.15 
 Reversing the Roe Court’s narrative regarding the harms of unwanted maternity, 
proponents of what Reva Siegel refers to as the “woman-protective” antiabortion 
argument16 instead focus their critique of abortion on the devastating harms of disrupting 
the natural bond that exists between a mother and her unborn child. As David C. Reardon, 
12   Id. (quoting Am. Med. Ass’n, Report of the AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion, 12 tRanSactionS 
am. meD. aSS’n. 73, 78 (1859) [hereinafter 1859 Report]).
13   See, e.g., JameS c. mohR, aboRtion in ameRica: the oRiGinS anD evoLution of nationaL poLicy 167 
(1978).
14   DaviD c. ReaRDon, makinG aboRtion RaRe: a heaLinG StRateGy foR a DiviDeD nation 3 (1996).
15   For a richly detailed history of the development of this approach see Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: 
Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 Duke L.J. 1641 (2008) 
[hereinafter Siegel, The Right’s Reasons]; Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis 
of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 u. iLL. L. Rev. 991 (2007) [hereinafter Siegel, The New 
Politics of Abortion].
16   Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 15.
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a leading architect of this approach, puts it: “the only way to kill an unborn child is by 
maiming and traumatizing the child’s mother.”17 Given this increasingly popular framing 
of the antiabortion argument, which seeks to restrict access to abortion for women’s own 
purported good, it is hard to be quite as sanguine about the Court’s failure to account for 
the multi-dimensional origins of the nation’s criminal abortion laws.18  
While it would certainly be too much to argue that a fuller exposition of this history 
would have somehow prevented the emergence of the “pro-woman” antiabortion position, I 
nonetheless contend that if the Roe Court had exposed the gendered origins of our criminal 
abortion laws, the deep paternalism of the woman-protective approach may well have 
attracted more critical attention than it did prior to 2007 when the Supreme Court’s embrace 
of the abortion regret trope served to focus greater public and scholarly attention on this 
development.19 In short, this historic knowledge serves to sharpen our understanding of 
the longstanding link between the regulation of abortion and the effort to control women’s 
reproductive bodies, thus making it clear that antiabortion activism has never simply been 
about protecting the fetus.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we take a close look at the physicians’ 
mid-nineteenth century campaign to criminalize abortion. Specifically, we will focus on 1) 
the launch of their campaign; 2) the physicians’ framing of their effort as a “bold and manly” 
appeal;20 3) their focus on preserving and protecting women’s purity and divinely ordained 
maternal role; 4) their claim that abortion was rife with injurious impacts as embodied in 
the view that it marked the uterus with a “stamp of derangement”;21 and 5) the antiabortion 
physicians’ claim that abortion, as practiced by white, middle-class women, threatened 
the racial character of the nation. In Part II, we turn to the Court’s landmark decision in 
Roe v. Wade. Zeroing in on its examination of the historical underpinnings of the nation’s 
criminal abortion laws, we first take a look at what the Roe Court said about this history, 
followed by a discussion of what the Court missed—namely, its elision of the gendered 
17   ReaRDon, supra note 14, at viii.
18   For an important article on the significance of the Court’s failure to account for this history, see Reva 
B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal 
Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261 (1991) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning from the Body].
19   As Siegel observes, prior to the Court’s decision in Gonzales, “the rise of gender-based antiabortion 
arguments was barely noticed in the mainstream press or by scholars outside the public health field.” Siegel, 
The Right’s Reasons, supra note 15, at 1648.
20   hoRatio R. StoReR, Why not? a book foR eveRy Woman 102 (1866) [hereinafter StoReR, Why not?].
21   Id. at 60.
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and racialized tropes that permeated the physicians’ antiabortion campaign. In Part III, we 
examine the late twentieth-century emergence of the “pro-woman/pro-life” antiabortion 
argument. After consideration of the traditional fetal-centric “pro-life” position, we turn 
to the origins of this new frame. This discussion is followed by a comparison of the core 
themes of the nineteenth-century physicians’ campaign with the contemporary woman-
protective antiabortion position. These themes include: 1) that abortion is incompatible with 
women’s true nature, 2) that meaningful consent is an impossibility, and 3) that abortion 
is inherently harmful to women. In conclusion, this Article circles back to the Roe Court’s 
narrow reading of the physicians’ campaign to argue that if the Roe Court had engaged 
in a more robust reading of this history, the gendered paternalism of the contemporary 
“pro-woman/pro-life” position would have been rendered far more visible as a discredited 
approach to pressing women into motherhood. 
I.  The Medical Campaign to Criminalize Abortion
In 1821, the state of Connecticut passed a law making it a crime to provide a woman 
who was “quick with child” with a “deadly poison” in order to induce a miscarriage.22 
Enacted as part of an omnibus criminal reform statute, this measure was inserted between 
a provision governing the “intent to kill or rob” and one addressing the “secret delivery of 
a bastard child.”23 As James C. Mohr informs us in his seminal work on the subject, this 
was the first time an American legislative body sought to regulate the practice of abortion, 
which, at the time, was governed by common law principles.24
According to Mohr, the Connecticut anti-poisoning law and other similar measures that 
a number of states enacted between 1821 and 1841 were aimed at regulating the practice of 
abortion, as the methods used to induce a miscarriage, such as toxic poisons, often killed the 
pregnant woman along with the fetus. These measures were generally enfolded into broad 
omnibus laws, and no lawmaker “cast a recorded vote for or against abortion as a question 
by itself” or “took a political stand” on the issue of criminalization.25 In short, as he argues, 
they were aimed at “regulating the activities of apothecaries and physicians” rather than 
at “dissuading women from seeking abortions,”26 and they were thus not imbued with the 
22   mohR, supra note 13, at 21.
23   Id. at 20–21.
24   Id. at 23.
25   Id. at 42.
26   Id. at 43–44.
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profound moral and social significance that permeated the next wave of physician-inspired 
antiabortion laws.
In this initial legislative period, abortion was typically associated with the errant 
behavior of unmarried women who, as one physician put it, were seeking to “destroy the 
fruits of illicit pleasure, under the vain hope of preserving their reputation by this unnatural 
and guilty sacrifice.”27 Due to its close association with illicit behavior, abortion was thus 
generally regarded as a “fundamentally marginal practice,” which did not attract much 
attention unless a woman died or was seriously injured.28 
By mid-century, however, the abortion rate had started rising, and regular physicians 
(meaning those who had been formally educated in the medical arts) reported on this trend 
with growing concern. Most alarming was the fact that the rates were rising among married 
women who were seeking to limit the size of their families.29 Capturing the clear distinction 
that most drew between the errant maiden and the married woman, in his annual address to 
the San Francisco Medical Society, Dr. Henry Gibbons explained that: 
We can appreciate the motives that lead to feticide in females who have 
slipped from the path of virtue—unjustifiable and criminal as the act still 
is. But that married women should follow in the path of the harlot admits 
not the shadow of a shade of an excuse or palliation.30
Or, as Dr. August K. Gardner put it, “for the married shirk, who disregards her divinely-
ordained duty, we have nothing but contempt. If glittering gems adorn her person, within 
there is foulness and squalor.”31 Compounding, or perhaps at the root of the horror that they 
felt over the fact that married women were adopting the behavior of the “harlot” who had 
“slipped from the path of virtue,” was that these women tended to be “white, Protestant, 
native-born . . . and of the middle or upper class.”32 In short, the married women who were 
27   Hugh L. Hodge, On Criminal Abortion: A Lecture Introductory to the Course on Obstetrics of Women 
And Children, Introductory Lecture for the 1839 Medical Class at the University of Pennsylvania 18 (1854).
28   mohR, supra note 13, at 44.
29   Id. at 86.
30   Henry Gibbons, Annual Address Before the San Francisco Medical Society 12 (Nov. 9, 1869).
31   auGuStuS k. GaRDneR, conJuGaL SinS aGainSt the LaWS of Life anD heaLth, anD theiR effectS upon 
the fatheR, motheR anD chiLD 112 (1870).
32   mohR, supra note 13, at 46.
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seeking to control their fertility were from the same social strata as the regular doctors, 
while women of “inferior” status were continuing to fulfill their maternal obligations. 
A.  The Launch of the Campaign 
At the 1857 meeting of the Suffolk District Medical Society, Dr. Horatio Storer, a 
local, Harvard-educated gynecologist, alerted the Boston physicians in the audience to the 
alarming frequency of induced abortions among respectable married Protestant women 
in the city as observed by him in his medical practice.33 Seeking to mobilize his peers 
to end what he would soon characterize as the “slaughter of countless children now 
perpetrated in our midst,”34 he persuaded the local Boston medical society and the recently 
founded American Medical Association (AMA) to establish committees for the purpose 
of investigating the matter of criminal abortion with a view “to its general suppression.”35
At its 1859 annual meeting, the AMA’s appointed Committee on Criminal Abortion 
presented its report (which was authored by Storer) condemning the “wanton and 
murderous destruction” of the unborn, and, in a series of unanimously adopted resolutions, 
the Association formally declared it the duty of its members “as physicians, and as good 
and true men” to “publically [sic] . . . enter an earnest and solemn protest against such 
unwarrantable destruction of human life laws” and to “present this subject to the attention 
of the . . . legislative assemblies . . . with the prayer that the laws by which the crime of 
procuring abortion . . . may be revised.”36
Moving forward, the AMA remained “steadfastly and officially committed to outlawing 
the practice of abortion in the United States . . . and the vigorous efforts of America’s 
regular physicians would prove in the long run to be the single most important factor in 
altering the legal policies toward abortion in this country.”37 Reflecting their efforts, by 
the end of the century, abortion had become a statutory crime in all states unless a doctor 
33   Frederick N. Dyer, Horatio Robinson Storer, M.D. and the Physicians’ Crusade Against Abortion, in 
Life anD LeaRninG iX: pRoceeDinGS of the ninth univeRSity facuLty foR Life confeRence 3 (1999).
34   1859 Report, supra note 12, at 76.
35   Id. at 75.
36   pauL StaRR, the SociaL tRanSfoRmation of ameRican meDicine: the RiSe of a SoveReiGn pRofeSSion 
anD the makinG of a vaSt inDuStRy 58 (1982).
37   mohR, supra note 13, at 157.
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certified that the procedure was necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.38
The logical question, of course, is what compelled Storer and his colleagues to take up 
the antiabortion cause? According to Mohr and Kristen Luker, authors of classic works on 
the subject, a key motivating factor was their desire to upgrade the status of the medical 
professional in order to distinguish “true” doctors from the lay practitioners who had 
flooded the field during the early decades of the century.39 In addition to increasing the 
competition for patients, these “irregular healers” viewed the “medical profession as a 
bulwark of privilege” and, with some success, they appealed to state lawmakers to repeal 
the existing medical licensing laws on the grounds that they were “an expression of favor 
rather than competence.”40  
Dispirited by the competition for patients and the challenge to their status, regular 
physicians sought to find a way to “distinguish themselves both scientifically and socially 
from competing practitioners,” in order to persuade lawmakers that they were deserving of 
licensing laws that would drive irregulars out of the medical field.41 According to Luker, 
abortion proved the ideal vehicle for this task as an attack on the laxity of the law would 
enable elite doctors to “claim both moral stature (as a high-minded, self-regulating group 
of professionals) and technical expertise (derived from their superior training).”42 
While their antiabortion campaign may well have served professional aims, Storer and 
his colleagues were also actuated by deep and far-ranging objections to abortion, which 
they regarded as a subversive act. Laying claim to a manly sense of purpose, they drew 
upon normative understandings of women’s divinely ordained place in the domestic and 
social order, as shaped by racial, class, religious and ethnic considerations, to argue that 
the state should entrust the abortion decision to their expertise. Their template for reform 
was thus forged in a paternalistic and racialized code of white-male moral authority over 
women’s reproductive bodies.
 
38   According to Mohr, the only exception to this pattern was Kentucky, which achieved the same result by 
way of judicial decision rather than through a statutory enactment. Id. at 229.
39   See generally id. at 160–64; kRiSten LukeR, aboRtion & the poLiticS of motheRhooD 16–35 (1985).
40   StaRR, supra note 36, at 58.
41   LukeR, supra note 39, at 27–31.
42   Id. at 31 (emphasis in original).
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B.  The “Bold and Manly Appeal” of the Antiabortion Physicians
Storer characterized the physician’s consultation room as a confessional “wherein 
under the implied pledge of secrecy and inviolate confidence, the most weighty and at 
times astounding revelations are daily made.”43 In his role as intimate confidant, he was a 
self-described witness to the fearful reality that induced abortion interfered with “all the 
elements of domestic happiness and . . . the matron’s own self-respect,” and accordingly 
transformed the marital relationship from a “spiritual union” into a “sensual” one, by which 
it was reduced to the level of “legalized prostitution.”44
Grounded in this truth as purportedly derived from their first-hand knowledge of 
women’s experiences, Storer and his colleagues proclaimed it their duty to rescue the 
abortion-minded matron from her potentially catastrophic anti-maternalist impulses. As 
framed, this was not simply a struggle between physicians who happened to be men and 
their patients who happened to be women; rather, it was a contest born out of a deeply 
gendered understanding of the social role and place of each in the natural order. Fused 
together as mutually reinforcing strands, activist physicians effectively deployed a binary 
model of female transgression and male moral responsibility as a catalyst for reform. 
Capturing the twining of these elemental assumptions, after impressing upon the members 
of the Philadelphia County Medical Society the importance of the physician’s duty to 
inform his patients that abortion is “the destruction of human life,” Dr. Coates advised his 
colleagues that if “after being properly instructed, they still persevere in importuning us . . . 
they are not only inviting us to step far, far down from our high position as physicians . . . 
they are offering an indignity to our manhood . . . .”45
According to the 1859 Report of the AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion, authored 
by Storer, a physician’s duty towards his female patients was derived from the fact that 
they were the “physical guardians” of women.46 Although delineated by the use of the term 
“physical” to matters of the body, as the following legal definition of the term “guardian” 
makes clear, this is an intrinsically inegalitarian relationship:
43   StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 18.
44   Id. at 14.
45   Dr. Coates, Remarks for Discussion on the Subject of Abortion: Its Causes, Dangers, and Treatment, 4 
meD. & SuRGicaL Rep. 538, 542 (1860). 
46   1859 Report, supra note 12, at 76.
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A guardian is a person lawfully invested with the power, and charged 
with the duty, of taking care of the person and managing the property 
and rights of another person, who, for some peculiarity of status, or 
defect of age, understanding, or self-control, is considered incapable of 
administering his own affairs.47
Reinforcing the conflation of woman’s physical body with her mental incapacity, Storer 
stressed that it was a woman’s physiological makeup that rendered her incapable of self-
management:
If each woman were allowed to judge for herself in the matter, her decision 
upon the abstract question would be too sure to be warped by personal 
considerations, and those of the moment. Woman’s mind is prone to 
depression, and indeed, to temporary actual derangement . . . . During the 
state of gestation the woman is therefore liable to thoughts, convictions 
even, that other times she would turn from in disgust or dismay.48
Wedded in a hierarchical relationship by women’s decisional incompetence, Storer thus 
“reasoned from the body,” to use Siegel’s wonderfully evocative concept,49 to justify his 
claim that the law should invest the physician with authority over women’s reproductive 
decisions.
Embodying the manliness of their efforts, in an 1855 speech to the entering class of 
Harvard Medical School, Dr. David Humphrey—the father of Storer and a professor of 
obstetrics and medical jurisprudence—expressed his unmet hope that “one of the strong 
men of the profession . . . would have spoken . . . against [the] existing and universally 
acknowledged evil” of abortion.50 Having, however, waited in vain for this wall of silence 
to be breached, he felt compelled to urge his audience to speak out as men against the evil 
that “stalks at midday through the length and width of the land” since a “true man fears, 
can fear, nothing.”51
47   Guardian, the LaW DictionaRy, http://thelawdictionary.org/guardian/ [perma.cc/W9ZZ-FMBP].
48   StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 74–75.
49   See Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 18.
50   David Humphrey Storer, Two Frequent Causes of Uterine Disease, 6 J. GynaecoLoGicaL Soc’y boS. 
195, 195 (1872) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Storer, Two Frequent Causes of Uterine Disease].
51   Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
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Reinforcing the potential power and authority of a united manhood, Storer, who credited 
his father for his interest in the abortion cause,52 subsequently advised his colleagues 
that a “bold and manly appeal” would be more effective than the “scattered influence of 
honorable practitioners alone” in ending the evils of abortion.53 He thus decreed that a 
“bold and manly utterance of the truth . . . should be made by the members of the profession 
on every occasion.”54 Echoing these sentiments in a lecture to medical students, Professor 
A.F. Small implored that “[b]y all that is human, all that is noble and grand in the attributes 
of true manhood . . . every physician should set up his face against this practice and hold it 
up as murder in public and private.”55
Although clearly aimed at restricting women’s autonomy, doctors framed this distinctly 
masculine project as one of direct benefit to women. Waxing eloquent, Hodge proclaimed 
it was:
the absolute necessity of the science and practice of obstetrics to . . . 
protect and preserve a being so wonderfully constructed, so beautiful, so 
interesting, so moral, so intellectual, and so influential for good over the 
best interests of man, and over the destinies of nations.56
Accordingly, as Storer and his activist colleagues urged, it was incumbent upon them to 
persuade lawmakers of the necessity of erecting “better and more effective safeguards . 
. . about our women to ‘protect them from themselves.’”57 Poetically capturing the deep 
paternalism of this “pro-woman” sense of mission, Dr. Andrew Nebinger explained: 
In this work, I desire to be regarded as the friend of woman . . . . So far 
from being pleased to behold her stained and spotted with crimes . . . I 
would have her as pure and as white, because of her freedom from vice, as  
 
52   Dyer, supra note 33, at 4.
53   hoRatio R. StoReR, on cRiminaL aboRtion in ameRica 102 (1860) (emphasis added).
54   Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
55   A.E. Small, Criminal Abortion, A Lecture Before the Class of Hahnemann Medical College, 2 meD. 
inveStiGatoR 37, 38–39 (1865) (emphasis added). 
56   Hodge, supra note 27, at 8.
57   G. Maxwell Christine, the meDicaL pRofeSSion vS. cRiminaL aboRtion, tRanScRipt of the 25th SeSSion 
of the homeopathic meD. Soc’y of the State of pa. 69, 70–71 (1889) (emphasis added). 
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was Eve, when she, in full exemption from sin, dwelt in perfect purity and 
surpassing beauty in the garden of Eden.58
As they sought to restore woman to her dwelling place of “perfect purity and surpassing 
beauty,” antiabortion physicians vacillated between themes of female ignorance and 
transgression to justify their assertion of authority over women’s pregnant bodies. 
C.  Preserving and Protecting the Citadel of Woman’s Purity and Her 
Divinely Ordained Maternal Role
The most generous explanation given as to why a married woman might choose to 
terminate a pregnancy was that she did not understand that the pre-quick fetus was fully 
human. As Hodge explained, even 
[e]ducated, refined, and fashionable women—yea in many instances, 
women whose moral character is, in other respects without reproach . . .  
are perfectly indifferent respecting the foetus in utero. They seem not to 
realize that the being within them is indeed animate—that in verity, a 
human being.59
In a similar vein, Storer elucidated that while all women “understood that abortion 
entailed” the “premature expulsion of the product of conception” it was less well known 
“that this product of conception is in reality endowed with vitality from the moment of 
conception itself.”60 The attribution of women’s actions to their ignorance enabled doctors 
to avoid confronting the fact that women, and most particularly, those “educated, refined, 
and fashionable women,” of their social strata, might, in fact, be motivated by far more 
troubling considerations, namely the avoidance of their maternal obligations. By blaming 
the horror of abortion on “the completeness of [women’s] ignorance,”61 doctors could 
cast them as “inadvertent murderesses, persons led astray because they believed in the 
doctrine of quickening,” which enabled them to “condemn the ‘sin’ without the necessity 
of condemning the ‘sinner.’”62  
58   anDReW nebinGeR, cRiminaL aboRtion: itS eXtent anD pRevention 32 (1870).
59   Hodge, supra note 27, at 18 (emphasis in original).
60   StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 29.
61   nebinGeR, supra note 58, at 14.
62   LukeR, supra note 39, at 22 (emphasis in original).
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The stress upon women’s ignorance reinforced the above-discussed masculine nature 
of the physician’s mission. Seeking to rescue them from the “relic[s] of a barbarous 
physiology,”63 the burden fell to them “as good and true men,” to “enlighten this 
ignorance.”64 Dramatically capturing the exigent nature of this mission, having called upon 
his colleagues to devise a “blessed plan” through which “women may be promptly and 
fully instructed in all that regards the life of the being in her womb . . . and as to the 
murderous nature of the offense of destroying it,” Dr. Nebinger implored them to take 
immediate action: “‘Why stand we here idle?’ [W]hy sleep we like an unworthy and never 
watchful sentinel, when the citadel of woman’s purity is being daily and hourly assailed, 
and not sound the alarm that ‘all is not well with her?’”65
By teaching them that the destruction of their unborn children was the moral equivalent 
of infanticide, doctors could claim that they were saving “these wretched women . . . [from] 
murdering their children through ignorance.”66 In turn, this would allow them to take credit 
for restoring domestic order as, once so enlightened, what virtuous woman “would be 
accessory to so foul a deed as the destruction of her offspring, nestling in the sanctuary 
assigned it by creative wisdom and benevolence?”67
Although some antiabortion physicians may have genuinely assumed that women were 
careless in their attitude towards abortion because they mistakenly believed that the being 
within them was not fully human, a suspicious strand also flowed beneath this stream. 
As Storer remarked, “I have already stated that in many instances it is alleged by the 
mother that she is ignorant of the true character of the act of willful abortion, and in some 
cases I am satisfied that the excuse is sincerely given”; casting doubt, however, upon the 
veracity of even those whose “excuse is sincerely given” he continues on to state that “in 
these days of the general diffusion of a certain amount of physiological knowledge, such 
ignorance would seem incredible.”68 Echoing this view of the untrustworthy woman, Dr. 
63   Henry Miller, President of the Am. Med. Ass’n, Address Delivered Before the American Medical 
Association at its 13th Meeting, in 13 tRanScRipt am. meD. aSS’n. 54, 57 (1860).
64   1859 Report, supra note 12, at 76.
65   nebinGeR, supra note 58, at 12–13.
66   StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 69–70.
67   Miller, supra note 63, at 57–58.
68   StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 70 (emphasis added). This supposition fits with Luker’s assertion 
that at the time the physicians launched their crusade “[w]omen (and the general public) knew that pregnancy 
was a biologically continuous process from beginning to end.” LukeR, supra note 39, at 25 (emphasis in 
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Meredith D. Reese likewise suggested that “even the married, to postpone the cares of 
a family, the perils of parturition, the privations and duties of maternity” may persuade 
themselves “into the vulgar fallacy that there is no life before quickening, and that early 
abortionism is therefore less than murder,”69 while Dr. William M. Pritchett commented on 
their sometimes “pretended surprise” at hearing from their medical attendant that abortion 
is tantamount to cold-blooded murder.70
This vacillation regarding the sincerity of a married woman’s belief that her unborn 
child was not yet fully human reveals the physicians’ uncertainty over whether she was 
indeed a hapless victim of her own ignorance or instead the callous murderess of her unborn 
child—a tension in view that, as discussed below, would reemerge within the twentieth-
century antiabortion movement. Certainly, attributing the abortion decision to female 
ignorance was a far more benign explanation for her behavior; however, far more typically, 
the aborting woman was cast as a domestic subversive whose behavior threatened natural 
hierarchies—a view that allowed doctors to position themselves as stalwart defenders of 
both the family and the nation.
The antiabortion physicians had little compassion for the “wicked freak of a married 
woman who does not wish any longer to be a mother.”71 Capturing this sentiment, Dr. 
William Pritchett declared that the profession had “nothing but contempt” for the “married 
woman who disregards her divinely-ordained duty” because she “‘does not want to be 
bothered with any more brats . . . ’ ‘can hardly take care of those she has,’ ‘is going to 
Europe in the spring,’ etc.”72 In like fashion, Dr. Gardner denounced the married woman 
who destroyed her unborn child as a “pitiful, God-forsaken wretch” whom “all true 
humanity despises . . . and hoots at.”73
But what accounts for the harshness of their views? Why did the physicians who 
original).
69   meReDith ReeSe, teStimony befoRe the Senate of the State of neW yoRk, Rep. of the comm. appointeD 
to inveStiGate the heaLth Dep’t of n.y.c., Documents of the Senate of the State of New York, Vol. 2, 82d 
Sess., at 87, 95 (1859).
70   William M. Pritchett, Criminal Abortion, 7 meD. miRRoR 471, 471–73 (1896).
71   John Bell, Report of the Committee on the Relations of Alcohol to Medicine, 20 tRanScRipt am. meD. 
aSS’n 237, 316–17 (1869).
72   Pritchett, supra note 70, at 471.
73   GaRDneR, supra note 31, at 226.
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spearheaded the antiabortion campaign lack compassion for the married woman who 
wished to avoid or postpone the obligations of motherhood? It is in answering these 
questions that we come face-to-face with the strength of their conviction that abortion was, 
as Siegel succinctly puts it, “a rebellious, incipiently political act,”74 which they believed 
had to be vigorously suppressed if the gendered domestic and social order that they held 
dear was to remain intact. 
Repeatedly in the articles they wrote for medical journals and in speeches they gave 
before their colleagues, antiabortion physicians characterized abortion as contrary to 
“nature and all natural instinct.”75 As Storer proclaimed, “Is there no alternative but for 
women, when married and prone to conception, to occasionally bear children? This . . . is 
the end for which they are physiologically constituted and for which they are destined by 
nature.”76 Accordingly, he opined that “[w]ere women intended as a mere plaything, for the 
gratification of her own or her husband’s desire, there would have been no need for her of 
neither uterus nor ovaries.”77
As would again be the case with the modern proponents of the “pro-woman/pro-life” 
position, the antiabortion physicians’ concept of nature was inextricably conjoined with the 
divine. Storer thus declared it women’s “holiest duty . . . to bring forth living children,”78 
while Dr. Pritchett cast it as her “divinely-ordained duty.”79 Directly linking this sacred 
duty to her physiology, Dr. Nathan Allen declared that “the organization of woman . . . 
demonstrate[s] that married life and the production of children are one of the primary 
objects of her creation . . . it is a law which God has made applicable to all races and 
nations.”80
The phrase “physiological sin,” which Dr. H.S. Pomeroy employed to express his 
opposition to all acts, including abortion, that interfered with “Nature so that she cannot 
74   Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 18, at 304.
75   StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 15.
76   Id. at 75–76.
77   Id. at 80–81.
78   Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
79   Pritchett, supra note 70, at 471 (emphasis added).
80   Nathan Allen, Population: Its Law of Increase, Address Before the Meeting of the Western Social 
Science Association 16 (1868) (emphasis added).
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accomplish the production of healthy human beings”81 neatly encapsulates this infusion 
of divine belief into the domain of science. As Siegel writes, the concept “enfolded old 
authority within new, using religion and science to define the obligations of marriage 
in reproductive terms.”82 In short, not only did the antiabortion doctors derive “a wife’s 
duty from . . . facts about her body,”83 they imbued these facts with sacred meaning, thus 
impressing the stamp of the divine upon her corporeal being.
In addition to, as discussed below, drawing a direct causal link between the subversive 
nature of abortion and its proclaimed negative impact on women’s physical and emotional 
wellbeing, Storer and others also specifically warned of the adverse consequences of 
trifling with the divine. In this spirit, the 1871 Report of the AMA Committee on Criminal 
Abortion—which, as we will see, was referenced by the Roe Court in its historical recounting 
the nation’s criminal abortion laws—warned that the woman who “becomes unmindful of 
the course marked out for her by Providence,” and “yields to the pleasures but shrinks from 
the pains and responsibilities of maternity,” no longer “merit[s] the respect of a virtuous 
husband.”84 Looking ahead to the future, she can thus expect to sink “into old age like a 
withered tree, stripped of its foliage; with the stain of blood upon her soul” and die “without 
the hand of affection to smooth her pillow”—a bleak fate that she has brought upon herself 
as “[s]uch was not the plan of the Deity with regard to woman; such is not the character 
of her high destiny.”85 Equally dismal, Dr. Henry Gibbons, in the Annual Address before 
the San Francisco Medical Society, forewarned that the married woman who subverts the 
“holy instinct” is a monster who, through her “satanic perversion of nature,” destroys the 
“Divine image in [her] heart.”86
Grounded in the view that woman’s divinely ordained duty was to bring forth living 
children, not surprisingly, the antiabortion physicians were highly dismissive of the 
reasons a married women might have for wanting to terminate a pregnancy, such as, for 
instance, the “fear of labor” or worries about the “care, the expense, or the trouble of 
81   h.S. pomeRoy, the ethicS of maRRiaGe 97 (1895).
82   Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 18, at 295.
83   Id. at 296.
84   Am. Med. Ass’n, Report of the AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion, 22 tRanSactionS am. meD. aSS’n 
239, 241 (1871) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1871 Report].
85   Id. at 241–42 (emphasis added).
86   Gibbons, supra note 30, at 11.
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children”—concerns that Dr. William M. Pritchett dismissed as “trifling and degrading.”87 
Encapsulating this overweening sense of contempt, an editorial in the Medical and Surgical 
Reporter opined that
 
the only reason given by [married women] for killing their own offspring, 
and making their bodies dens of murder is the inconvenience of having 
children . . . and not to be prevented by fulfilling maternal destiny, from 
running about town, visiting friends, dressing finely, and attending parties, 
theaters, and the like.88 
In a similar vein, Dr. J. M. Toner admonished his colleagues not to “pander to the depraved 
sentiments, or to succumb, for the love of gain, to the unnatural demands . . . [of] the 
fashionable [wife]” who “does not wish to have her family increased, or attend to the 
wants of her offspring, and thereby forego the pleasures and freedoms of society” as her 
“sole happiness seems to depend upon [her] being seen upon the public promenade, and 
participants in the desultory pleasure of ballroom dancing.”89
Running beneath the surface of these varied explanations for why women were engaged 
in behavior that openly flouted the “holiest duty of [their] sex,” one can plainly glimpse the 
antiabortion physicians’ palpable fear that the respectable middle-class matron was being 
influenced to reject motherhood by the burgeoning Women’s Rights Movement, which 
launched its effort to overthrow the “absolute tyranny”90 of men over women at its 1848 
convention in Seneca Falls, New York. Boldly proclaiming in its founding document that 
“woman has too long rested satisfied in the circumscribed limits which corrupt customs 
and a perverted application of the Scriptures have marked out for her, and that it is time she 
should move in the enlarged sphere which the Creator has assigned her,” these early feminist 
activists thus directly challenged the physicians’ conflation of divinity and motherhood.91
The antiabortion physicians sounded the alarm that feminist agitation for an expanded 
realm of female activity had incited women to look upon “the carrying into effect the 
87   Pritchett, supra note 70, at 473.
88   Infantiphobia and Infanticide, 15 meD. & SuRGicaL Rep. 212 (1866) (emphasis in original).
89   J.M. Toner, Abortion in its Medical and Moral Aspects, 5 meD. & SuRGicaL Rep. 443 (1861). 
90   Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, Seneca Falls Convention (1848) http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/
docs/seneca.html [perma.cc/MWQ7-S52P].
91   Id. (emphasis added).
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noblest purposes of their being as alike a disaster and disgrace.”92 Echoing this sentiment, 
in a letter to the Medical Record, Dr. E.T. Milligan scoffed that “[m]ost American wives 
look on pregnancy as a domestic calamity and no amount of advice on the enormity of their 
sin or on their responsibility to Almighty God will deter them from what they believe to be 
the exercise of woman’s rights.”93 Likewise expressing disdain for the era’s “weak-minded 
and fashionable wives” who “sneer at a neighbor because of her large family” and look 
“upon maternity as a disgrace,” Dr. Edwin Hale bemoaned the fact that maternity was no 
longer “considered a crown of honor” and a woman was no longer “revered in proportion 
to the number of her children.”94
The doctors’ antipathy towards the “‘new woman’ [who] seems to think that having 
children is one those disagreeable incidents which must be avoided”95 reflected their 
apprehension that the gendered order of creation was at risk of being dismantled by those 
who believed that “woman was born for higher and nobler purposes than the propagation 
of her species.”96 As Dr. Montrose Pallen expounded: “[w]oman’s rights and woman’s 
sphere are, as understood by the American public, quite different from that understood by 
us as Physicians.”97 Elaborating, he went on to explain that:
‘Woman’s rights’ now are understood to be, that she should be a man, and 
that her physical organism, which is constituted by Nature to bear and 
rear offspring, should be left in abeyance, and that her ministrations in 
the formation of character as mother should be abandoned for the sterner 
rights of voting and law making.98
He thus decried the fact that “the whole country is in an abnormal state” on account of 
recent attempts to “force women into men’s places.”99
92   hoRatio StoReR, iS it i? a book foR eveRy man—a companion to Why not? a book foR eveRy 
Woman 112 (1868).
93   E.T. Milligan, Criminal Abortion, 52 meD. Rec. 32 (1897).
94   eDWin m. haLe, the GReat cRime of the nineteenth centuRy 12–13 (1867).
95   Correspondence: Editor Medical Mirror, 13 meD. miRRoR 231 (1902).
96   StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 198. 
97   Montrose A. Pallen, Foeticide, Or Criminal Abortion, 3 meD. aRchiveS 193, 205 (1868).
98   Id.
99   Id.
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And although he claimed to “feel sympathy with nearly every effort that has been 
put forth by earnest and true women for the advancement of their sisters,” Dr. Pomeroy 
nonetheless went on to blame the Woman’s Right Movement for the fact that 
there has grown to be a feeling among many women—some of them good 
and true ones, too—that the duties of maternity are a sort of low-grade 
drudgery which properly may be left to those who lack the will and the 
ability necessary to carry them into a higher sphere.100 
He thus chided those “apostles of woman’s rights who, in their well-meaning but misdirected 
efforts to arouse women to claim privileges now denied them, encourage their sisters to 
feel ashamed of the first and highest right which is theirs by the very idea of nature.”101  
The antiabortion physicians accordingly implored married women to embrace their 
maternal obligations. Dr. Gardner thus urged them to “accept the noble office you are 
called upon to perform” by “fold[ing] your children into your own selves.”102 In so doing, 
he promised that the “true woman” would come to realize that her desire for “dress and 
fashion” was meaningless beside these “pure joys.”103 While Dr. Pomeroy expressed the 
hope that women would come to appreciate the fact that “nations are made or unmade 
according to the love and care bestowed upon children before their birth, and the influence 
they receive in the nursery”; only then, he prophesized, 
will woman learn the dignity and blessedness of maternity, and . . . 
redouble her endeavors to acquire and use her every right and to drink 
more deeply at the fountain of knowledge—not that she may fill a sphere 
higher than maternity, but prepare herself to fill that sphere so well that her 




100  pomeRoy, supra note 81, at 137–38.
101  Id. at 95.
102  GaRDneR, supra note 31, at 235.
103  pomeRoy, supra note 81, at 139.
104  Id.
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D.  Marking Her Uterus with a “Stamp of Derangement”  
Having cast abortion as a “violation of all law, human and divine, of all instinct 
[and] all reason,”105 it is not surprising that the medical literature was replete with stern 
warnings regarding the parade of horribles that awaited the woman who dared to “arrogate 
to [herself] a right to decide as to the morality of taking or destroying the life of an unborn 
child.”106 Reflecting the senior Storer’s admonition that the laws of nature “cannot be 
broken with impunity” since the “Lawgiver is inexorable,”107 these harms were frequently 
cast as punishment for a woman’s disregard of her place in the gendered order of creation. 
As Hale put it, “[p]regnancy is a natural condition which cannot be arrested without the 
most calamitous results not only to the local condition of the reproductive organs, but 
to the general physiological functions of the whole system”108—results that Dr. Maxwell 
Christine characterized as the “evident punishment” which an “[o]utraged nature” 
unfailingly “inflicts upon the culprit.”109 Although, moving away from the view that post-
abortion suffering was a punishment, as we will see, proponents of the contemporary “pro-
woman/pro-life” approach would likewise cast abortion as a traumatizing event. 
The litany of predicted adverse physical outcomes ran the gamut from the “decay of 
womanly beauty,”110 to “chronic weakness, disease and disarrangement of her organs, 
and, possibly, by the forfeiture of her life.”111 Storer likewise warned about the risk of 
death. Invoking the punishment trope, he declared that the loss of life was a “penalty of 
unwarrantably interfering with nature, being occasioned by syncope, by excess of pain or 
by moral shock from the thought of the crime.”112
Storer also made clear that the potential risks of trifling with nature were not limited in 
time, and that although a woman “may seem to herself and to others to successfully have 
escaped [the] dangers” associated with abortion, she might well succumb to its punishing 
105  StoReR, iS it i?, supra note 92, at 94.
106  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 27.
107  Storer, Two Frequent Causes of Uterine Disease, supra note 50, at 200.
108  haLe, supra note 94, at 5.
109  Christine, supra note 57, at 73.
110  haLe, supra note 94, at 10.
111  Christine, supra note 57, at 73.
112  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 48.
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consequences upon reaching the “critical turn of life . . . when the fountains of youth dry up” 
and she “ceases from the periodical discharges, which in health and with care are the secret 
of her beauty, her attraction, her charm.”113 Accordingly, once the “stamp of derangement” 
had been impressed upon the womb, there was little comfort for the woman who had “had 
her own way against the dictates of her conscience” as she could look forward to a future 
marked by “possible disease, invalidism or death as the direct consequence of her folly.”114 
Particularly relevant for present purposes, in addition to stern warnings about the 
physical risks of abortion, the antiabortion physicians also warned of the likely adverse 
emotional consequences—a theme that, as we will see, would be picked up again in the 
twentieth century as the centerpiece of the woman-protective antiabortion position. With 
a prescient internal logic, Dr. Hale thus declared that remorse was the inevitable and 
predicable outcome of an act he characterized as the “sin of child-murder.”115 In a similar 
vein, Storer observed that:
there is probably always a certain measure of compunction for the deed 
in the woman’s heart—a touch of pity for the little being about to be 
sacrificed—a trace of regret for the child that, if born, would have proved 
so dear—a trace of shame at casting from her the pledge of a husband’s or 
a lover’s affection—a trace of remorse for what she knows to be wrong, 
no matter to what small extent, or how justifiable, it may seem to herself.116
Although Storer’s language appears to be somewhat gentle as he speaks simply of a “touch 
of pity” or “a trace of regret,” the theme of punishment is nonetheless apparent in his 
suggestion that women should expect to suffer from the commission of what she knows to 
be the wrongful act of “sacrificing” the “little being . . . that, if born, would have proved 
so dear.”  
At other moments, Storer also paints a far grimmer picture of the likely emotional 
impact of abortion. Again, drawing upon the exacting demands of the laws of nature he 
remarks that “the thought of the crime, coming upon the mind at a time when the physical 
system is weak and prostrated, is sufficient to occasion death.” While at other times “[t]
113  Id. at 59–60.
114  Id. at 60.
115  haLe, supra note 94, at 10.
116  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 43–44.
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he same tremendous idea, so laden with the consciousness of guilt against God, humanity, 
and even mere natural instinct, is undoubtedly able, where not affecting life, to produce 
insanity” either upon the “first and sudden occurrence [of the crime] to the mind, or, 
subsequently, by those long and unavailing regrets, that remorse, if conscience exists, is 
sure to bring.”117 
Although perhaps the most outspoken in this regard, Storer was not alone in linking 
mental derangement to abortion. For instance, the superintendent of the Michigan Insane 
Asylum spoke of remorse-induced insanity in women who, once having borne a child, 
came to realize the “priceless value of the gift [they] previously refused to accept”;118 while 
Dr. John P. Gray, Superintendent of a State Lunatic Asylum, likewise remarked that for 
many years he had “received and treated patients whose insanity was directly traceable to 
this crime, through its moral and physical effects.”119
Storer and other antiabortion physicians regularly insisted that the emotional and 
physical tolls of abortion were significantly greater than those associated with childbirth.120 
However, in light of their view that the aborting woman was a gender outlaw whose 
criminal conduct ineluctably marked her uterus with a “stamp of derangement,” it seems 
rather evident that their view of the comparative risks were shaped by their a priori beliefs 
regarding the intrinsic evils of abortion compared to the sacred nature of motherhood. 
Supporting this view, their contemporaries spoke out about the serious dangers of 
pregnancy and childbirth. For example, Dr. Charlotte B. Brown commented that repeated 
cycles of pregnancy and childbirth might well “cause women to be invalids, with special 
diseases”;121 while Dr. W. W. Johnston intoned that in many cases following childbirth 
“the health is never regained . . . [and the] principal manifestations of this persistent ill 
health are chronic anemia, with malnutrition, and impaired or altered function in all the 
organs, especially in those of the nervous system.”122 Similarly, neurologist George M. 
117  Id. at 49. 
118  Abortion as a Cause of Insanity, 7 N.Y. meD. J. 382 (1868).
119  John P. Gray, Abortion and Insanity, Annual Report of State Report Asylum for 1776 [sic], 2 meD. Rec. 
240 (1867–1868).
120  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 38–44.
121  Charlotte Brown, Rest Therapy in Gynaecology, 17 meD. StanDaRD 170 (1895).
122  W.W. Johnston, Chronic Anemia and Wasting in Newly Married Women. Some of the Causes of Their 
Persistence and Incurability, 1 tRanSactionS obStetRicaL & GynecoLoGicaL Soc’y WaSh. 162, 163 (1887) 
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Beard asserted in his book on nervousness in America that the “simple act of giving birth 
opens the door to unnumbered woes . . . compelling a life-long slavery to sleeplessness, 
hysteria, or insanity.”123 
According to Dr. William F. Montgomery, it was not uncommon for women to feel 
“depressed or dispirited with gloomy forebodings” in the early months of pregnancy, 
and although, as he observed, these negative feelings usually lifted, he observed that on 
occasions this depression instead assumed: 
a more serious aspect, and the woman is constantly under the influence of 
a settled and gloomy anticipation of evil, sometimes accompanied with 
that sort of apathetic indifference which makes her careless of every object 
that ought naturally to awaken an interest in her feelings.124 
Drawing a direct link between emotional and physical wellbeing, he went on to note that 
“when this occurs in pregnancy, it will generally be found accompanied by very evident 
derangements in bodily health.”125 
As Judith Walzer Leavitt accordingly writes in her classic work on the subject, not only 
did nineteenth-century women “spend considerable time worrying and preparing for the 
possibility of not surviving their confinements,” they were also generally well aware “that 
if procreation did not kill them, it could maim them for life.” For some, given the potential 
seriousness of post-partum injuries, “the fears of future debility were more disturbing 
than fears of death.”126 Reinforcing the seriousness of the mental health complications of 
pregnancy and childbirth, puerperal insanity was thought to be “responsible for at least 10 
percent of female asylum admissions.”127
(paper read at the May 20, 1877 meeting).
123  GeoRGe m. beaRD, ameRican neRvouSneSS: itS cauSeS anD conSequenceS 76–77 (1881). For an excellent 
discussion regarding the deeply racialized and class-specific significance of the nineteenth-century “epidemic” 
of nervous disorders in women, see Laura Briggs, The Race of Hysteria: “Overcivilization” and the “Savage” 
Woman in Late Nineteenth-Century Obstetrics and Gynecology, 52 am. q. 246 (2000).
124  WiLLiam fetheRSton montGomeRy, an eXpoSition of the SiGnS anD SymptomS of pReGnancy: With 
Some otheR papeRS on SubJectS connecteD With miDWifeRy 42–43 (1857).
125  Id.
126  JuDith WaLzeR Leavitt, bRouGht to beD: chiLDbeaRinG in ameRica, 1750–1950, 20, 28 (1986).
127  Nancy Theriot, Diagnosing Unnatural Motherhood: Nineteenth Century Physicians and ‘Puerperal 
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Deploying a critical intersectional lens, a number of scholars have documented the 
racialized understandings of the body that shaped these medical narratives of pregnancy 
and childbirth-related suffering. Grounded in “biologically essentialized” understandings 
of racial difference,128 including claims about the specific characteristics of the “negro 
pelvis,”129 some physicians asserted that while “savage women of the dark races gave 
birth painlessly, civilized white women suffered greatly in childbearing.”130 Reflecting 
interlocking assumptions regarding race and gender, Miriam Rich explains that this 
“highly racialized construct of femininity” was linked to the view that “civilized women: 
white, native-born, middle or upper-class ladies” exhibited “a high degree of sensitivity 
to suffering” from which “savage women of the dark races” were immune due to their 
position on the bottom rungs of the evolutionary scale.131 Significantly, she argues that with 
the demise of slavery, which had previously functioned to “stabilize racial differences,” 
these “ascendant medico-scientific studies of race” were deployed to protect the “integrity 
of racial boundaries by embedding them in the measurements of the body and the 
conformation of the bones.”132
It is hopefully apparent that a deeply troubling irony is at work here. Namely, it was 
the same class of women whom physicians believed were most likely to suffer from the 
travails of pregnancy and childbirth at which their antiabortion campaign was aimed.133 
This observation complicates our existing gendered analysis of the antiabortion campaign, 
and makes clear that this singular lens does not adequately capture the animating sentiments 
that drove the doctors to fight for the criminalization of abortion. We can catch a glimpse 
of the racialized themes that populated the campaign in Dr. W.W. McFarlane’s tongue-in-
cheek proposal to end the “slaughter of innocents . . . practiced by our society women” by 
sending “Chinese women Missionaries on Nobb Hill to teach our aristocratic ladies the 
Insanity’, 30 am. StuD. 69, 70 (1989).
128  Miriam Rich, The Curse of Civilised Woman: Race, Gender and the Pain of Childbirth in Nineteenth-
Century American Medicine, 28 GenDeR & hiSt. 57, 64 (2016).
129  Briggs, supra note 123, at 261.
130  Rich, supra note 128, at 57.
131  Id. at 58, 57; see also Briggs, supra note 123, at 257–59.
132  Rich, supra note 128, at 65.
133  I am not seeking to establish that the individual doctors were one and the same. Rather, the point is that 
as a group, elite male physicians simultaneously engaged in both discourses regarding the reproductive conduct 
of the demographic cohort. 
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sacredness of motherhood and the wrong of murder.”134 Revealed here in this deliberate 
reversal of the traditional missionary relationship is the antiabortion physicians’ palpable 
fear that “their” women had become ignorant of their maternal duties while the lowly 
“other” fully embraced it—a fear that, as discussed in the following section, led them to 
view abortion as “an offense of a national and political character.”135
E.  The Threat to White Anglo-Saxon Dominance
As we have seen, in pursuing the criminalization of abortion, Storer and his colleagues 
pushed back against woman’s rights activists, whom they charged with inciting women to 
abandon their maternal duties in favor of “the sterner right of voting and law making.”136 
Importantly, however, as Nicola Beisel and Tamara Kay stress in their seminal work on 
the subject, “the critical political context for the antiabortion movement was not only 
suffragists’ claims for women’s rights, but also the massive immigration that undermined 
Anglo-Saxon political power and social hegemony.”137 Awash in the fear that immigrants 
would soon outnumber the native-born population, antiabortion physicians deployed 
racialized tropes to persuade their colleagues and the public at large that the use of abortion 
by “their” women threatened the Anglo-Saxon race.138
By linking “reproductive politics” to “racial politics,” antiabortion physicians hoped to 
defend the nation from being overrun by immigrants, whom they viewed as “bearers and 
propagators of alien values that would ultimately destroy American culture.”139 Building 
outwards from the domestic realm, not only did they claim, as Storer put it, that “all the 
elements of domestic happiness” and the preservation of marriage as a “spiritual union”140 
134  W.W. McFarlane, Proceedings of Societies, 35 p. meD. J. 308 (1892) (emphasis added).
135  haLe, supra note 94, at 4. 
136  Pallen, supra note 97, at 205–06.
137  Nicola Biesel & Kay Tamara, Abortion, Race, and Gender in Nineteenth-Century America, 69 am. Soc. 
Rev. 498, 499 (2004).
138  As Biesel and Tamara explain, today we do not typically conjoin the terms “race” and “Anglo-Saxon,” 
and instead “see only subtly varying shades of a mostly undifferentiated whiteness.” Id. at 500. However, in 
the nineteenth century, as immigration rates rose, native Anglo-Saxons increasingly regarded “the Irish and 
Germans, and later the Jews, Italians and Slavs . . . as members of inferior races who were unfit for self-
government and a threat to the republic.” Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
139  Id. at 499.
140  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 13–14.
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depended upon the married woman’s fulfillment of her procreative duties, they also asserted 
that the future character of the nation hinged upon the willingness of native-born wives to 
reproduce and replenish their kind. 
In his influential mid-century study, which was relied upon by many physicians as well 
as by the AMA’s Committee on Criminal Abortion in the preparation of their 1871 Report, 
Dr. Nathan Allen worriedly concluded, based upon his analysis of census data, that “all 
or nearly all” of the increases in population in New England were attributable to those of 
“foreign descent.”141 In like fashion, based upon his “most careful analysis of the births 
and deaths” in Massachusetts, Dr. Chickering gloomily described the growing population 
imbalance:
In many school districts of country towns, where the population is made up 
wholly or principally of American stock, you can hardly find now children 
enough to make in numbers a respectable school . . . . On the other hand, 
in large towns and villages, where the foreign population abounds, we find 
an abundance of children.142
Encapsulating these demographic trends, Storer observed that “the population of our 
older States,” to the extent that it “depends upon the American and native element . . . is 
stationary or decreasing,”143 thus clearly marking immigrants and their children as other 
than American. 
This was hardly a neutral recitation of the changing composition of the nation. Decrying 
the plummeting birthrate of the native Puritans, Dr. Allen dolefully predicted that “if the 
average amount of children among the Americans to each marriage should continue to 
decrease . . . the best stock that the world ever saw, under what would be considered the 
best family training, the highest order of educational influences, and the purest religious 
instruction,” was likely to “run out” and be replaced by “a people of foreign origin, with 
far less intelligence and a religion entirely different.”144 In similarly desultory fashion, 
James Whitmore reported that “we are fast losing our national characteristics, and slowly 
merging into those of our foreign population” due to the abortion practices of native-born 
141  Allen, supra note 80, at 5.
142  As quoted in nebinGeR, supra note 58, at 8.
143  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 63. 
144  Allen, supra note 80, at 5–6.
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women.145 Doctors also expressed their apprehension about the dilution of Anglo-Saxon 
political power. Gesturing to the future, Dr. Chickering pondered how long it would take 
if “a majority of all the youth and children under fifteen years of age in a place is made up 
from those of a foreign parentage” before “such a power will be felt in the management, if 
not in the control, of the municipal government of those towns and cities.”146
Predicting that “it [would] not be many years before the Americans left on American 
soil, will be few and far between,” Hale declared abortion to be “an offence of a national 
and political character,” and he called upon the government to “interpose some check to 
its alarming increase.”147 Similarly decrying the fact that “in so far as depends upon the 
American and native element . . . the population of our older States . . . is stationary or 
declining,” Storer proclaimed that abortion was not merely a crime “against the life of the 
child and the health of its mother . . . but that it strikes a blow at the very foundation of 
society itself.”148 Looking to the “great territories of the West, just opening to civilization 
and the fertile savannas of the South,” which stood ready to “offer homes for countless 
millions yet unborn,” he posed the question whether those lands were to “be filled by our 
own children or by those of aliens? This is a question that our own women must answer; 
upon their loins depends the future destiny of the nation.”149 
In short, in addition to her duty to stabilize the domestic order by embracing her holiest 
obligation, the middle-class married matron was also declared to have a special responsibility 
to reproduce for the good of the nation. Standing as a bulwark against depopulation, her 
procreative capacity was not hers alone to manage; rather, it was something she owed to 
“an intelligent Christianity, and to an intelligent and safe civilization, and to the State and 
Nation . . . to the great American idea of free schools and a free Protestant religion.”150 
 
 
145  James S. Whitmore, Criminal Abortion, A Paper Read Before the Woodford County Medical Society, 31 
chi. meD. J. 385, 392 (1874).
146  As quoted in nebinGeR, supra note 58, at 8. 
147  haLe, supra note 94, at 4.
148  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 64.
149  Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
150  Biesel & Tamara, supra note 137, at 509 (discussing J.t. cook, a book foR eveRy Woman anD eveRy 
home! 36 (1868)).
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II.  The Roe Court’s Examination of the Historical Record
Likely seeking to head off anticipated criticism that its decision was an abrupt break 
with legal tradition, the Roe Court began its historic inquiry with the observation that 
[i]t perhaps is generally not appreciated that the restrictive criminal 
abortion laws in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage. 
Those laws . . . are not of ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, 
they derive from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter 
half of the 19th Century.151 
Underscoring their “relatively recent vintage,” the Court further observed that: 
It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our 
Constitution, and throughout a major portion of the 19th century, abortion 
was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently 
in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader 
right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today.152
In tracing the shift away from the common law quickening rule that permitted abortion 
up until the woman first felt fetal movement, which generally occurs sometime between 
the sixteenth and twenty-fifth week of pregnancy,153 the Court focused on the role that the 
medical profession played in the enactment of the nation’s restrictive abortion laws.154 
Seeking to uncover the “attitude of the profession” towards abortion, it directed its attention 
to the two above-discussed reports that were issued by the AMA’s Committee on Criminal 
Abortion in 1859 and 1871.155 
151  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
152  Id. at 140.
153  Underscoring its point that women “enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy” 
under common law as compared to their contemporaneous right, the Court further observed that the question 
of whether “the abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser crime, is still disputed.” 
Id. at 134. 
154  According to the Court, the medical profession shared “the anti-abortion mood prevalent in this country 
in the late 19th century.” Id. at 141. However, as discussed below, the medical profession did not simply share 
passively in existing attitudes; rather, it played a major role in changing public attitudes towards abortion.
155  See 1859 Report, supra note 12; 1871 Report, supra note 84, at 258. 
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As noted in the introduction, the Court’s reading of this record creates the distinct 
impression that the sole animating concern behind the physicians’ campaign was the 
protection of the unborn. While these reports certainly reflect this objective, the 1871 
Report, in particular, offers a far more complete record of their aims—a record that is 
wholly elided by the Roe Court’s singular focus on the physicians’ “pro-life” aims. 
A.  What the Roe Court Did Say About the Physicians’ Nineteenth-Century 
Campaign to Criminalize Abortion
Drawing on the AMA Reports, the Court emphasized the medical profession’s 
commitment to halting the “‘unwarrantable destruction of human life’” as the prime reason 
behind its campaign to make abortion a statutory crime.156 By way of documenting this 
commitment, it quoted the 1859 Report’s assertion that “this general demoralization” was 
attributable to “wide-spread popular ignorance of the true character of the crime . . . the 
fact that the profession themselves are frequently supposed careless of foetal life . . . [and] 
the grave defects of our laws . . . as regards the independent and actual existence of the 
child before birth, as a living being.”157 As the Court further recounts, in response to this 
Report, the AMA unanimously adopted the Committee’s resolutions “‘protesting against 
such unwarrantable destruction of human life,’ calling upon state legislatures to revise their 
abortion laws, and requesting the cooperation of state medical societies in ‘pressing the 
subject.’”158 As confirmation of the physicians’ fetal-centered focus, the Court also pointed 
to the admonition in the Committee’s 1871 Report that when dealing with “human life,” 
compromise was not possible.159  
Accordingly, even the most discerning reader of the Roe decision would come away 
without any awareness of the gendered and racialized tropes that the physicians regularly 
invoked in support of their goal of making abortion a strict statutory crime. However, this 
discerning reader might protest that I have missed something in my review by pointing to 
the quoted resolution in the 1871 Report in which the Committee on Criminal Abortion 
called “the attention of the clergy of all dominations to the perverted views of morality 
156  Roe, 410 U.S. at 141 (quoting 1859 Report, supra note 12, at 73).
157  Id. (quoting 1859 Report, supra note 12, at 75–76). 
158  Id. at 142 (quoting 1859 Report, supra note 12, at 78).
159  Id. (quoting 1871 Report, supra note 84, at 258). According to Mohr, the Committee published this 
report to ensure that local medical societies did not falter in their efforts to push for statutory change in the wake 
of Storer’s departure from the country due to ill health. mohR, supra note 13, at 159.
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entertained by a large class of females—aye, and men also, on this important question,”160 
which arguably suggests that the Court was indeed attuned to the multi-dimensional nature 
of the physicians’ campaign. Although this is certainly plausible, unfortunately, this quote 
marks the end of the Court’s discussion of the physicians’ antiabortion crusade, save for 
its final observation that subsequent to the publication of the 1871 Report the medical 
profession periodically engaged in a “condemnation of the criminal abortionist.”161
B.  What the Roe Court Did Not Say About the Physicians’ Antiabortion 
Campaign
Another possible objection to my critical evaluation of the Roe Court’s reading of this 
medical-legal history is that it is unfair of me to expect the Court to have tracked down and 
analyzed primary source materials—particularly given that the relevant documents were 
from a prior century. This is certainly a well-placed remonstration—and, in fact, the Roe 
Court is to be commended for its impressive interdisciplinary approach that engages with a 
wide array of historical material. However, what is puzzling here is that a historical source 
that the Court actually referenced in the decision—namely, the 1871 Report of the AMA 
Committee on Criminal Abortion—is itself laden with the kinds of gendered and racialized 
arguments that the profession advanced in support of its goal of criminalization. In other 
words, the Court relied upon a primary source document that offered a direct window 
into the physicians’ view of abortion as a deeply destabilizing act that threatened both the 
domestic and the national order. To shed light on this omission, we turn to the 1871 Report 
itself to see what it actually offered the Court by way of further insight into the medical 
profession’s antiabortion campaign. Although these themes were discussed in Part I of this 
Article, they bear repeating here as specifically contained in the 1871 Report by way of 
casting light on what the Court could have readily gleaned from this document.
The 1871 Report positively bristles with indignation over the aborting woman’s willful 
subversion of her divinely impressed location in the created world. Recounting God’s 
commandment to Adam and Eve to “increase and multiply,” it asserts that woman’s “high 
destiny” is accordingly to “be instrumental in propagating the human family” within the 
sacred purity of marriage.162 The abortion-minded woman is thus warned that she who 
“becomes a participant in the destruction of her own offspring” steps down from this high 
place and is no longer “the appropriate representative of a refined age, a model of purity, 
160  Roe, 410 U.S. 113, at 142 (quoting 1871 Report, supra note 84, at 258) (emphasis added).
161  Id.
162  1871 Report, supra note 84, at 240–41.
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[and] the center of honor and affection,” as child-murder “was not the intention of the Deity 
with regard to woman.”163 Perhaps even more calamitously, as we have seen, the Report 
warns the woman who ignores “the course marked out for her by Providence” and “yields 
to the pleasure, but shrinks from the pains of responsibilities of motherhood” that she can 
expect to descend “into old age like a withered tree, stripped of its foliage, with the stain of 
blood upon her soul; she dies without the hand of affection to smooth her pillow.”164 
Driving home the Committee’s contempt for the married woman who turns to abortion, 
the Report continues on to glowingly recount the story of a Roman matron named Cornelia 
who, although “unaided by the light of Christianity,” responded to a friend’s request to 
see her jewels by explaining that her children “are my jewels . . . they are the pledges 
of a virtuous and honorable affection.”165 Noting that such would be the response of “an 
honest matron of the day,” in a well-trod theme, the Report continues on to disparage 
the woman who instead turns to abortion for selfishly “regarding the care and expense of 
children as a burden, as well as in preferring pleasure and fashion to domestic duties and 
responsibilities.”166
The Committee’s conviction that the aborting woman subverted God’s gendered 
order of creation was closely entwined with its nativist fears. In addition to specifically 
expressing concern that abortion was prevalent among “the intelligent, the refined, and 
the religious,”167 its use of the above-noted descriptors such as “representative of a refined 
age,” “a model of purity,” and “the center of honor and affection”168 conveyed the ideals 
of womanhood that were most closely associated with middle-class norms of respectable 
domesticity.
One does not, however, need to parse these descriptive hints regarding the true focus 
of their concern in order to uncover the Committee’s preoccupation with the depopulation 
of the nation. Going directly to the point, the Report relies upon Dr. Allen’s above-noted 
influential study of population shifts in New England and New York to sound the alarm 
163  Id. at 241–42.
164  Id.
165  Id. at 242.
166  Id. 
167  Id. at 244.
168  1871 Report, supra note 84, at 241.
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that there was “something of a grave nature, something mischievous, something radically 
wrong” afoot in the nation.169 It then highlights his demographic analysis showing that 
when compared to both their foremothers and the contemporary foreign-born, the birth rate 
of the “strictly American,” meaning those descended from the once “prolific” Puritans, had 
dropped precipitously—findings that the Committee regarded as “well calculated not only 
to surprise but to excite alarm.”170 
Encapsulating the intersecting nature of the medical profession’s concern with the 
aborting matron’s power to simultaneously destabilize the domestic and the national order, 
the Report shares Allen’s perplexity as to why married women who were “among the 
intelligent, the refined, and the religious” were placing “so low an estimate . . . upon the 
value of human life” and engaging in such a “persistent effort . . . to defeat one of the most 
important objects of the marriage institution.”171 It continues on to endorse his explanation 
for this state of affairs, namely, that “some radical change in the organization of woman” 
had blunted her “natural instincts” resulting in a state of affairs that, according to Allen, 
was unparalleled “in the history of any other civilized people, race, or nation.”172
Although ignored by the Court, even a cursory reading of the 1871 Report thus makes 
it clear that the protection of fetal life, which is hardly even mentioned, was far from the 
sole, or perhaps even the primary, aim of the antiabortion physicians. Having cast the 
aborting matron as doubly subversive for refusing to display a large brood of children 
as the jeweled exemplars of an unwavering commitment to “a virtuous and honorable 
affection,” it reveals the physicians’ deep commitment to restoring domestic and national 
order by impressing upon married women—most notably those of “native” stock—that 
their primary obligation was to propagate the species in accordance with divine command. 
Before considering the potential significance of the Court’s elision of the gendered 
underpinnings of our nation’s criminal abortion laws in relationship to the emergence of 
the contemporary woman-protective antiabortion argument,173 it behooves us to briefly 
169  Id. at 242. Allen’s work is discussed supra at notes 80, 141, and 144 and infra at note 226.
170  Id. at 242–44. 
171  Id. at 244 (quoting Allen, supra note 80).
172  Id. 
173  As we shift our gaze to the current pro-woman/pro-life platform, as noted in the Introduction, we also 
turn our gaze away from the racial and nativist underpinnings of our nation’s criminal abortion laws, as the 
continuity is less apparent, thus leaving this analysis to a future research project. 
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consider why it might have read the history of the physicians’ antiabortion campaign so 
narrowly—although, of course, there is no way to be certain about this. In this regard, 
Linda Greenhouse’s analysis of the Roe decision is quite instructive. 
Zeroing in on the place of pride that the Roe Court gave to physicians in the decision-
making process, with, for example, its concluding statement that the decision “vindicates 
the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional 
judgment,”174 Greenhouse observes that “[t]o modern ears . . . Roe’s paternalistic assumption 
that doctors . . . know what is best for their female patients sounds archaic.”175 Significantly, 
she writes that a reader of the decision “would come away with no reason to suspect that 
outside the four corners of this opinion, society was in ferment over a new discourse of 
women’s rights” and that it “would be quite reasonable for our reader to assume, in fact, 
that none of this discourse had even been presented to the Court in Roe.”176  
However, as Greenhouse documents, this was not the case as both the brief submitted 
by Jane Roe as well as those filed by various amici provided the Court with vigorous 
“women’s-rights argument[s] that reflected the broader social and political context in 
which the right to abortion was being debated.”177 For example, an amicus brief filed by the 
American Association of University Women asserted that: 
A woman whom the law would force to carry an unwanted pregnancy 
to term is, quite plainly, restricted and imposed upon to a greater degree 
than by any other action which the state could take, save execution of a 
sentence of death or possibly long term imprisonment.178
But, as Greenhouse expounds, the “impact [of these arguments] on the Court was slight,” 
particularly when compared to the apparent influence that the briefs filed by the medical 
professions asserting that the existing criminal laws interfered with “the ability of physicians 
 
174  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
175  Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications of a Shifting 
Discourse, 42 Suff. L. Rev. 41, 42 (2008).
176  Id. at 45.
177  Id. at 45–47.
178  Id. at 47 (quoting Brief of Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 23, 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70–18, 70–14)).
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to practice medicine in accordance with their highest professional standards” had on the 
Court.179 
Seeking to explain why the Court was “so attentive to one set of voices while evidently 
remaining oblivious to others,” Greenhouse concludes that it may not have been “ready to 
listen to the feminist voices . . . that were being raised in defense of reproductive freedom,” 
as this would have required it to “traverse two revolutions in thought in a single opinion.”180 
Reinforcing this theory, she further suggests that the “medicalized framing of Roe” may 
well have “offered the Court a safe realm . . . to which to entrust ‘decisions which required 
normative rather than scientific judgments, under a mask of professional expertise.’”181  
Supporting Greenhouse’s explanation, in discussing why sex equality was “efface[d] 
. . . as a normative basis for the abortion right,”182 Siegel writes that at the time Roe was 
decided, 
the Justices had scarcely decided any sex discrimination cases, and, 
while responsive, were plainly only beginning to understand the nature 
of the [women’s] movement’s claims. To the extent they did, the Justices 
nonetheless employed professional frames to justify the abortion right 
rather than the more politically provocative women’s rights frame, which 
called into question norms governing sex and family life.183
Elaborating on the politically provocative nature of the women’s rights frame, Siegel notes 
that in the years leading up to Roe, the women’s movement’s “sex equality claims for 
179  Greenhouse, supra note 175, at 47–48; see also Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims 
that Engendered Roe, 90 b.u. L. Rev. 1875 (2010) [hereinafter Siegel, Roe’s Roots].
180  Greenhouse, supra note 175, at 48 (quoting Jack m. baLkin, What Roe v. WaDe ShouLD have SaiD 23 
(2005)).
181  Id. (quoting Nan D. Hunter, The Myth of Medical Independence, 72 bRook. L. Rev. 147, 197 (2006)).
182  Siegel, Roe’s Roots, supra note 179, at 1900.
183  Id. (emphasis added). As Siegel further explains, the emergence of a constitutionalized sex discrimination 
jurisprudence also “effaced equality as a basis for reproductive rights.” Critically in this regard, not only did the 
landmark decision in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), which “stated the case for equal protection 
scrutiny of sex-based state action,” do so “without mentioning laws regulating reproduction,” but a year later, 
in Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Court also “rejected arguments that laws discriminating against 
pregnant women reflect sex stereotyping, and held that, for equal protection purposes, discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy was not necessarily the same as discrimination based on sex.” Id. at 1901.
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abortion rights” and its push for an Equal Rights Amendment to the federal constitution 
had mobilized a conservative antifeminist backlash which cast feminism “as a total assault 
on the role of the American woman as wife and mother and on the family as the basic unit 
in society.”184
Applying Greenhouse and Siegel’s view backward in time could possibly explain the 
Roe Court’s failure to grapple with the complex reality underlying our nation’s criminal 
abortion laws, although, again, there is no way of knowing this with any certainty. More 
specifically, had the Court confronted this legacy it would by necessity have been forced 
to recognize the fact that compelled maternity was not an inadvertent byproduct of 
these laws, but was, in fact, these laws’ intended purpose in order to inscribe normative 
understandings of divinely ordained domesticity upon women’s reproductive bodies. In 
turn, this recognition might well have obliged the Court to reason about the challenged 
Texas law within the “new feminist discourse of women’s rights”—a direction that, as 
these scholars argue, it was not yet ready to traverse. 
III.  Placing the “Abortion-Minded Woman” at the Center: The Reemergence of 
a Gender Paternalistic Antiabortion Argument
In the wake of the Roe decision, the antiabortion movement sought to persuade the 
public that abortion is wrong “simply because all life is sacred.”185 As Rose writes, this 
fetal-rights frame “put women’s perceived interests in conflict with those of fetuses, casting 
the million-plus American women who have abortions each year as morally repugnant 
perpetrators of a crime against their own unborn children.”186 This overarching focus “on 
the fact that children are being killed by abortion,”187 was a well-placed counter parry to the 
Roe Court’s rejection of the idea of fetal personhood, which the state of Texas had urged 
it to embrace. As Luker puts it, the Court’s ultimate conclusion that “the embryo is not a 
person, but only a potential person” was an anathema to those with a “commitment to the 
sacredness of embryonic life.”188   
184  Id. at 1900 (quoting Phyllis Schlafly, What’s Wrong with “Equal Rights” for Women?, phyLLiS SchLafLy 
Rep., Feb. 1972, at 1, 4).
185  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at 3.
186  Melody Rose, Pro-Life, Pro-Woman? Frame Extension in the American Antiabortion Movement, 32 J. 
Women, poL. & poL’y 1, 7–8 (2011).
187  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at 1 (emphasis in original).
188  LukeR, supra note 39, at 140.
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Although the dominant approach of the antiabortion movement was to make “its case 
in the public square as well as the courts by emphasizing the humanity of the fetus,”189 the 
post-Roe era also witnessed the exponential growth of crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs), in 
which a mostly volunteer female staff counseled pregnant women towards motherhood in 
order to shield them from a life of emotional trauma.190 As Karissa Haugeberg documents, 
during the 1970s and 1980s “CPC volunteerism operated at the grass roots and appealed 
to women who did not agree with the aims of the fetus-focused conventional activism 
and who did not identify with other activists who had begun organizing protests against 
abortion.”191 CPC counselors are often drawn to this work based on their own negative 
abortion history, as shaped by a religious belief that all children are gifts from God and all 
women are fated for motherhood.192 
Throughout the 1980s, this woman-centered approach largely remained ensconced 
within the intimate space of the CPCs and the emergent “abortion-regret” organizations, 
such as Women Exploited by Abortion (WEBA), which offered women a safe space within 
which to share personal stories of post-abortion grief.193 In short, this feminized antiabortion 
discourse threaded women together in supportive environments with little discernible 
impact on the public face of the antiabortion movement. During this time, as Siegel notes, 
not only were claims about abortion’s harmful impact on women “overshadowed by fetal-
189  Francis J. Beckwith, Taking Abortion Seriously: A Philosophical Critique of the New Prolife Rhetorical 
Shift, ethicS & meD. 155, 155 (2001).
190  As Alesha Doan explains, the antiabortion movement is comprised of three branches or streams that 
“share the ultimate goal of wanting to end abortion but disagree on the best approach to achieving their goal.” 
aLeSha Doan, oppoSition anD intimiDation: the aboRtion WaRS anD StRateGieS of poLiticaL haRaSSment 
89 (2009). Specifically, the direct action stream focuses on “the immediacy of ‘saving’ babies and women 
by deterring women from seeking abortion services via direct intervention [and] keeps the issue visible and 
salient in local communities”; the political stream seeks to “keep an anti-abortion agenda visible in political 
institutions” and works to “shape change through traditional political channels such as lobbying, political 
campaigns, and litigation”; while the outreach stream, which is comprised of CPCs, “offers a variety of services 
for women experiencing a ‘problem pregnancy’. . . [in order to] encourage her to forgo an abortion and either 
keep the baby or place the child up for adoption.” Id. at 89–91.
191  kaRiSSa hauGebeRG, Women aGainSt aboRtion: inSiDe the LaRGeSt moRaL RefoRm movement of the 
tWentieth centuRy 19 (2017).
192  See generally id. at 9–22; Alesha Doan & J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, “Teaching Morality by Teaching 
Science”: Religiosity and Abortion Regret, in RepRoDuctive ethicS: neW chaLLenGeS anD conveRSationS (Lisa 
Campo-Engelstein & Paul Burcher eds., 2017); Kimberly Kelly, In the Name of the Mother: Renegotiating 
Conservative Women’s Authority in the Crisis Pregnancy Movement, 38 SiGnS 203 (2012). 
193  Regarding abortion-regret groups, see hauGebeRG, supra note 191, at 42–45.
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focused arguments,” they were generally “powerfully opposed by antiabortion advocates 
who thought [them] an ungrounded distraction from the real moral states of the abortion 
debate.”194 However, in the early 1990s, this woman-centered approach was appropriated 
by male antiabortion activists as a strategy for reinvigorating their movement.
A.  The Emergence of the “Pro-Woman/Pro-Life” Antiabortion Position 
During the early 1990s, the antiabortion movement began to lose momentum under 
the cumulative weight of a series of setbacks. These included the election of pro-choice 
presidential candidate Bill Clinton; the resounding failure of Congress to nullify Roe by way 
of a federal measure, either declaring that life begins at conception or returning the abortion 
issue to the states;195 and the Court’s ignominious 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey that reaffirmed the fundamental nature of the abortion right.196 As a result, some 
activists lost faith in the use of “traditional political channels such as lobbying, political 
campaigns, and litigation” to accomplish their ends and instead turned to confrontational 
and violent tactics in order to shut down the abortion “industry.” Select tactics ranged 
from pickets and demonstrations to the firebombing of clinics and the targeted murder of 
abortion doctors and clinic staff.197
In response to this radical turn, “the anti-abortion movement became perceived as a 
violent, extremist, and fanatical movement by more and more of the American public, 
creating a significant public relations challenge.”198 This challenge was not lost on its 
leaders. Speaking directly to this point, John Willke, the president of the highly influential 
National Right to Life Committee, lamented that based on market research the general 
public viewed pro-life people as “right-wing religious zealots, [who] shoot abortionists and 
burn down clinics, [who] are fetus-lovers and care little about the mother after she delivers 
. . . and are not compassionate to women.”199 
194  Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 15, 1161–62 (emphasis in original).
195  Doan, supra note 190, at 83.
196  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
197  Doan, supra note 190, at 89, 157.
198  pauL SauRette & keLLy GoRDon, the chanGinG voice of the anti-aboRtion movement: the RiSe of 
pRo-Woman RhetoRic in canaDa anD the uniteD StateS 78 (2015).
199  John c. WiLLke & baRbaRa WiLLke, Why can’t We Love them both: queStionS anD anSWeRS about 
aboRtion 16 (1997).
Columbia Journal of Gender and law 21335.2
Seeking to counter this perception and persuade the public that “pro-lifers are 
compassionate to women,”200 some antiabortion activists accordingly began to argue that 
the time had come for the movement to shift away from its traditional fetal-rights frame 
in favor of a “pro-woman” message that would attract new adherents to the cause.201 As 
a result, as Siegel writes, what had been a “therapeutic and mobilizing discourse initially 
employed to dissuade women from having abortions and to recruit women into the abortion 
cause” within the private and dominantly female CPC movement was transformed into a 
“political discourse,” or what Siegel refers to as the new “woman-protective antiabortion 
argument,” which was designed to “persuade audiences outside the movement’s ranks” 
that abortion should be restricted in order to protect women from harm.202
In 1996, David C. Reardon, a chief architect of this “pro-woman/pro-life” argument 
against abortion, published Making Abortion Rare: A Healing Strategy for a Divided Nation 
in which he called upon activists to place the “aborted-women” at the center of its plan to 
“create a culture where abortion is not just illegal, but is unthinkable.”203 He thus urged his 
compatriots to adopt a strategy aimed at persuading the “ambivalent majority,” by whom 
he meant those who are “discomfited by the killing of unborn babies” but are willing to 
set aside their uneasiness based upon their “concerns for the welfare of women,”204 to join 
their cause. Accordingly, rather than “reduc[ing] public sympathy for women,” who turned 
to abortion, Reardon insisted that they should instead seek to “increase it and align it with 
our own outrage at how women are being victimized” in order to advance “our political 
agenda.”205 In short, he hoped to reverse the “countercultural” nature of the “traditional 
pro-life strategy”206 due to its anti-woman nature by repositioning the movement as the 
200  Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
201  See generally Rose, supra note 186.
202  Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 15, at 1649 (emphasis in original). 
203  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at xv (emphasis in original). Although a minority voice at the time, Reardon 
was not alone in calling for this frame shift. Most prominently, in addition to John Willke, Frederica Mathewes-
Green, a significant figure in the CPC movement, also pushed the movement to adopt a woman-focused 
approach in order to break out of the “It’s a baby,” “No, it’s her right” stalemate. Frederica Mathewes-Green, 
Seeking Abortion’s Middle Ground, WaSh. poSt (July 28, 1996); see also Paul Swope, Abortion: A Failure to 
Communicate, 82 fiRSt thinGS 31 (1998).
204  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at 21.
205  Id. at 27. As discussed infra notes 226–30, Reardon’s understanding of women’s victimization was 
firmly anchored in his religious beliefs regarding God’s intended plan for women.
206  Id. at 136–37.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law214 35.2
advocate for the “authentic rights of women.”207 
While a detailed discussion of the diffusion of the “pro-woman/pro-life” position is 
beyond the scope of this Article, one need only look at the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gonzales v. Carhart and the Report of the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, 
which are both quoted at the outset of this Article, to appreciate the extent to which the pro-
woman message has spread.208 In Gonzales, although acknowledging the lack of “reliable 
data to measure the phenomena,” the Court nonetheless relied on the proposition that it was 
“unexceptional to conclude that some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant 
life they once created and sustained” and that “[s]evere depression and loss of self-esteem 
can follow” as a primary justification for its conclusion that the federal “Partial-Birth” Ban 
of 2003 was constitutional.209 
In support of this proposition, the Court cited the amicus brief filed by the deeply 
conservative and religiously-oriented Justice Foundation on behalf of Sandra Cano (the 
plaintiff in Doe v. Bolton,210 the companion case to Roe v. Wade)211 and “180 Women Injured 
by Abortion,” whose sworn testimonies of abortion grief were solicited by Operation 
Outcry—a self-described ministry of the Justice Foundation.212 Notably, the Court cited the 
pages of the brief that referenced the work of Reardon, and characterized him as “one of the 
leading experts on the effects of abortion on women,”213 despite the fact that, as discussed 
207  Id. at ix. 
208  For a detailed discussion of the Report of the South Dakota Task Force, see Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, 
supra note 15, at 1643–56; for details on the diffusion of the woman-protective antiabortion position, see 
id. at 1647 n.20 and Saurette & Gordon, supra note 198, at 301–08. One can also see the diffusion of this 
approach by looking at the websites of antiabortion groups such as Feminists for Life, (feminiStS foR Life, 
www.feministsforlife.org [perma.cc/MU52-Z8AP]); Hope After Abortion (hope afteR aboRtion, www.
hopeafterabortion.org [perma.cc/6QV5-KKHG]); Operation Outcry, (opeRation outcRy, http://www.
operationoutcry.org/ [perma.cc/DQ69-8XGR]).
209  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
210  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
211  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
212  opeRation outcRy, http://thejusticefoundation.org/cases/operation-outcry/ [perma.cc/8A8K-NG69].
213  Brief for Sandra Cano, the Former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women Injured by Abortion 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 
1436684. For a detailed critique of the Court’s reliance on this brief, see J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Ministering 
(In)justice: The Supreme Court’s Misreliance on Abortion Regret in Gonzales v. Carhart, 17 nev. L.J. 599 
(2017).
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below, his views have been discredited by the evidence-based research of highly respected 
professional organizations.214
The Task Force Report likewise relied upon the Operation Outcry affidavits in supporting 
its claim that abortion is “inherently dangerous to the psychological and physical health of 
the pregnant mother.”215 Grounded in the proposition that a “mother’s unique relationship 
with her child is one of the most intimate and important of relationships” it went on to 
explain that: 
this method of waiver of the mother’s rights expects far too much of the 
mother. It is so far outside the normal conduct of a mother to implicate 
herself in the killing of her own child. Either the abortion provider must 
deceive the mother into thinking the unborn child does not yet exist, and 
thereby induce her consent . . . or the abortion provider must encourage 
her to defy her very nature as a mother to protect her child.216
Echoing Reardon’s assertion that the time had come for the antiabortion movement to 
represent the “authentic rights of women,”217 the Task Force accordingly stated that the 
“current legal policy found in our country today, that promotes the destruction of [a mother’s] 
relationship with her child . . . instead of her relationship with the child is a denigration of 
women”; and recommended replacing it with one that would instead “promote motherhood 
and counter [the idea] that the exclusive ‘right’ to abortion liberates women.”218 
Although the “pro-woman/pro-life” antiabortion position has clearly traveled far 
since Reardon first published Making Abortion Rare, as he ruefully acknowledged in the 
book’s introduction, at the time of publication in 1996, he faced an uphill battle persuading 
activists to adopt the pro-woman approach, which had been “misunderstood and treated 
like a distant relative of the ‘main’ pro-life cause.”219 As he explains:
214  See infra note 255.
215  RepoRt of the South Dakota taSk foRce to StuDy aboRtion, supra note 1, at 55, 66.
216  Id. at 56.
217  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at ix (emphasis in original).
218  RepoRt of the South Dakota taSk foRce to StuDy aboRtion, supra note 1, at 66 (emphasis added). 
219  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at vii.
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I never intended to write this book. For the last twelve years, my goal 
has been to educate the general public about how women are seriously 
injured and exploited by abortion. I have discovered, however, that I am 
instead spending most of my time trying to explain to pro-life activists 
exactly why post-abortion issues are the key to converting hearts—the key 
to winning the battle for life.220
Although there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Reardon’s assessment of the difficulty 
of the task that lay before him, had he taken a longer view of the matter, he would have seen 
that rather than representing a radical break from the past, as we have seen, our criminal 
abortion laws were rooted in the woman-protective views he was now advocating. In short, 
as we have seen, these laws were never simply about protecting the unborn, but had from 
their inception been intended to manage women’s reproductive bodies.221  
B.  New Wine in Old Bottles
Although there certainly are some differences between the views of the nineteenth-
century antiabortion physicians and the contemporary proponents of the “pro-woman/
pro-life” position, as articulated most clearly by Reardon, a direct and demonstrable 
historic through-line nonetheless exists between the gendered narratives that each has 
employed in order to restrict women’s bodily autonomy. This narrative arc is best conveyed 
by a consideration of three closely-linked core themes, namely: the idea of abortion as 
incompatible with women’s true nature, the impossibility of meaningful consent, and the 
emotional costs associated with violating one’s nature. 
Before turning to these themes, two caveats are in order. First, as we are about to 
see, while there is an explicit narrative arc that directly connects the gendered arguments 
advanced by the physicians and those made by proponents of today’s “pro-woman/pro-
life” position across time and space, there is not an obvious link with regard to racialized 
themes. Given that these are not openly articulated in the same way, far more excavation 
is required to determine if and how such views are conjoined with the gender tropes in 
today’s woman-protective antiabortion position. Accordingly, although we examined the 
nineteenth-century effort through an intersectional lens, this approach will not be carried 
220  Id. (emphasis in original).
221  It is at this juncture that we drop the racialized tropes that were woven into our criminal abortion laws 
from our discussion. As indicated infra at notes 222–24, determining if these directly track forward into the 
contemporary “pro-woman/pro-life” position requires further inquiry. 
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through to the present within the confines of this Article. 
Of course, this is not intended to suggest that current attacks on abortion rights are 
not deeply racialized. By way of example, antiabortion groups have erected billboards in 
predominantly African American neighborhoods that warn of a “black genocide” being 
waged by the likes of Planned Parenthood. This campaign is designed to persuade the 
community that their children are an “endangered species” due to the deliberate targeting 
of black women by a racially motivated white abortion industry.222  
Fighting back against this initiative, the group SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive 
Justice Collective explains that this is a “misogynistic attack to shame-and-blame black 
women who choose abortion, alleging that we endanger the future of our children . . . 
[and] to claim that black women have a racial obligation to have more babies . . . despite 
our individual circumstances.”223 Also pushing back against this effort, Dr. Willie Parker, 
writes of his aversion, as “an African American abortion provider”224 to this cynical use 
of “women of color as pawns in a much bigger game,” the goal of which, he argues is 
to “eventually limit access to abortion for all women, including, and especially, white 
women. Because the thing that all too many white antiabortion activists really want, which 
they can’t say out loud, is for white women to have more babies in order to push back 
against the browning of America.”225
The second caveat is that the below discussion is intended to offer a comparative 
view of essential gender-focused (as distinct from fetal-focused) themes that cut across 
and link together two distinct generations of antiabortion activists. Given this focus, 
comprehensiveness is not the primary goal; rather it is to highlight the ways in which the 
222  See toomanyaboRteD.com, http://www.toomanyaborted.com [perma.cc/HL8D-SALG].
223  SiSteRSonG, poLicy RepoRt, Race, GenDeR anD aboRtion: hoW RepRoDuctive JuStice activiStS Won in 
GeoRGia (2010), https://www.trustblackwomen.org/SisterSong_Policy_Report.pdf [perma.cc/2ZVC-RM3C].
224  WiLLie paRkeR, Life’S WoRk: a moRaL aRGument foR choice 161 (2017).
225  Id. at 164. For additional sources on the racial implications of contemporary attacks on abortion 
rights, including those writing within a reproductive justice framework, see generally LoRetta J. RoSS & 
Rickie SoLinGeR, RepRoDuctive JuStice (2017); JaeL SiLLiman et aL., unDiviDeD RiGhtS: Women of coLoR 
oRGanizinG foR RepRoDuctive JuStice (2016); Jessica Gonzalez-Rojas, Abortion Laws Have Created 
Two Nations, and Women of Color Pay the Price, the hiLL (Oct. 1, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/
congress-blog/healthcare/219340-abortion-laws-have-created-two-nations-and-women-of-color-pay 
[perma.cc/EP5T-ZM8Q]; centeR foR RepRoDuctive RiGhtS, WhoSe choice? hoW the hyDe amenDment haRmS 
pooR Women (2010), https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Hyde_
Report_FINAL_nospreads.pdf [perma.cc/XJK6-U5WF].
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contemporary woman-protective approach recapitulates the deeply paternalistic approach 
to women’s reproductive bodies that was woven into the very fabric of the nation’s criminal 
abortion laws.
1.  Abortion as Incompatible with Women’s True Nature
As discussed above, in contradistinction to the Roe Court’s narrow fetal-focused framing 
of the physicians’ nineteenth-century antiabortion campaign, these activists were in fact 
deeply preoccupied with the place and meaning of abortion in women’s lives. Crucially, as 
we have seen, they pointed to “married life and the production of children” as the divinely 
ordained end points of female existence.226 Accordingly, they characterized abortion as a 
“physiological sin”227 based on the belief that the practice subverted a woman’s “holiest 
duty . . . to bring forth living children.”228 Not only did they derive “a wife’s duty from . . . 
facts about her body,”229 they infused these facts with a deep religiosity, which inexorably 
led them to conclude that abortion was “against nature and all natural instinct.”230
Like the antiabortion physicians, Reardon also firmly asserts that abortion is directly 
contrary to women’s divinely constituted nature. In a section of Making Abortion Rare 
headed “The Natural Order of Things,” he states as follows: “We begin with a very simple 
observation. In God’s ordering of creation, it is only the mother who can nurture her unborn 
child. All that the rest of us can do, then, is to nurture the mother.”231 Grounded in this 
truth, he continues on to explain that this “is why, from a natural law perspective, we can 
know in advance that abortion is inherently harmful to women. It is simply impossible to 
rip a child from the womb of a mother without tearing out a part of the woman herself.”232 
Paralleling the physicians’ firm belief that woman was put on earth in order to procreate, 
Reardon thus insists that this natural law proposition “is not an optional truth. It reflects 
God’s ordering of creation.”233 Although less explicitly religious, the Task Force Report 
226  Allen, supra note 80, at 16.
227  pomeRoy, supra note 81, at 97.
228  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 21, at 81.
229  Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 18, at 296.
230  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 15.
231  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at 4.
232  Id. at 5.
233  Id. at 6. For further discussion of the ways in which criminal abortion laws and the Court’s jurisprudence 
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likewise embraces this essentialized understanding of woman’s true nature. Yoking her 
destiny to her reproductive physiology, it explains that “the intrinsic beauty of womanhood 
is inseparable from the beauty of motherhood,” which accordingly makes it far outside the 
“normal conduct of a mother to implicate herself in the killing of her own child.”234
Although the nineteenth-century physicians framed their antiabortion argument in 
terms of woman’s divinely ordained duty to bring forth living children, and Reardon 
instead focuses on the divinely inscribed bond between a woman and her unborn child, 
for both, the travesty of abortion is that it subverts a natural and unalterable truth derived 
from women’s biological capacity to bear children. In short, it is this disruption of God’s 
gendered order that must be righted through the wrapping of the law around woman’s 
reproductive body so as to restore her rightful place in the kingdom. 
Although resolutely united in their view of abortion as being in direct and irresolvable 
tension with women’s true nature, two important differences between the antiabortion 
physicians and the contemporary proponents of the pro-woman/pro-life position should 
be noted here. First, as we have seen, with the possible exception of the married woman 
who did not realize that the pre-quick fetus was alive, the nineteenth-century physicians 
had “nothing but contempt” for the “married shirk who disregards her divinely-ordained 
duty”235 by rejecting motherhood. 
In contrast, the modern woman-centered approach seeks to recast the aborting woman 
as a victim. As Reardon explains, although “[m]any good-hearted people continue to recoil 
in horror at anyone who could ‘kill her baby,’” and they wonder “‘[w]hat kind of monster 
could do such a thing?’” it is important to instead “portray aborting women as confused, 
and driven by despair” in order to persuade the ambivalent majority that abortion harms 
women, and thus attract them to the movement.236 
 
reflect “stereotypes about women’s judgment and morality,” see Paula Abrams, The Scarlet Letter: The Supreme 
Court and the Language of Abortion Stigma, 19 mich. J. GenDeR & L. 293, 294 (2013); Megan Cahill, Abortion 
and Disgust, 48 haRv. c.R.-c.L. L. Rev. 409 (2013); Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent 
and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 Duke J. GenDeR L. & poL’y 223 (2009); Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra 
note 15; Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 18.
234  RepoRt of the South Dakota taSk foRce to StuDy aboRtion, supra note 1, at 56, 67.
235  GaRDneR, supra note 31, at 8, 112.
236  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at 8, xiv.
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Secondly, while the nineteenth-century physicians made no attempt to conceal the 
religious origins of their views regarding women’s true nature as they took their cause 
into the public arena, in Making Abortion Rare, Reardon expressly recognizes that for 
purposes of public consumption, the divine wellspring underpinning the woman-protective 
approach must be buried under the guise of scientific rationality. He accordingly proposes 
that the movement adopt the strategy of “teaching morality by teaching science,” in order 
to persuade “nonbelievers” of the truth of their message, which, it should be noted, he 
asserts will eventually lead them to “respect the wisdom of God’s law.”237  
In like fashion, Allan Parker, president of the Justice Foundation, shared with his 
followers that the brief, which the Justice Foundation went on to file in the Gonzales 
case, was inspired by a revelation from God when he was en route home from the annual 
March for Life Rally in Washington, D.C. in 2000. Speaking to Parker in the Dulles-Fort 
Worth airport, the Lord informed him that “only through the testimonies of women hurt 
by abortion could [they] refute the lie that abortion is good for women.”238 However, the 
amicus brief itself makes no mention of this revelatory pathway to the Court, and although 
the appended affidavits of the 180 injured women are shot through with religious motifs, 
the excerpted portions in the body of the brief were carefully edited to exclude any hint of 
religious themes. 
2.  The Impossibility of Meaningful Consent 
Flowing directly from the shared view of abortion as inimical to women’s essential 
and inviolable maternalism, we come to another shared theme—namely, the virtual 
impossibility of meaningful consent. As understood, this impossibility is linked either to 
a woman’s ignorance regarding the humanity of her unborn child, or more likely to the 
meaninglessness of authorizing an act that threatens to destroy one’s essential being. 
Starting with the antiabortion physicians, as we have seen, some attributed the married 
woman’s decision to abort to her ignorance regarding the fact that “the being within [her] 
is indeed animate—that it is, in verity, a human being.”239 In turn, this claim of ignorance 
enabled them to view her as the unintentional destroyer of her unborn child who would 
be stricken with “grief and remorse” were the truth laid upon her “otherwise innocent 
237  Id. at 11.
238  E-mail from Allan E. Parker, President, The Justice Found. (Nov. 11, 2015) (on file with author).
239  Hodge, supra note 27, at 18 (emphasis in original).
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bosom.”240 In like manner, the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion claims that many 
women do not realize that abortion will “terminate the life of a human being,” and that this 
basic “lack of understanding” is compounded by abortion providers who are intent upon 
deceiving them into believing that their unborn child is “nothing but tissue.”241 So viewed, 
a woman’s consent to abortion is thus effectively vitiated by her lack of understanding that 
she is essentially authorizing the murder of an existing child who is already a member of 
her family.242
However, ignorance itself is not the key consideration here. As we have seen, most 
nineteenth-century physicians attributed the abortion decision to trivial and frivolous 
considerations, such as that a woman “‘does not want to be bothered with any more brats,’ 
‘[c]an hardly take care of those she has,’ ‘is going to Europe in the spring,’ etc.”243 Accordingly, 
no matter how fervent and sincere her desire to avoid the burdens of motherhood, because, 
for example, she was overwhelmed by caring for her existing children, or had other 
aspirations, her concerns were dismissed as flimsy and unwarranted justifications for 
permitting her body to become “a den of murder.”244 In tautological fashion, the reasons 
underlying a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy were dismissed as inauthentic 
because they were at odds with her divinely-ordained nature, and because they contravened 
her essentialized being, they were dismissed as intrinsically without merit. Even more 
blatantly dismissive of women’s decisional capacity, Storer simply declared that pregnant 
women were predisposed to “temporary actual derangement,” and thus were prone to make 
a decision (namely to terminate a pregnancy) that “at other times [they] would turn from 
in disgust or dismay.”245
Compounding the believed inauthenticity of a woman’s consent, many physicians 
blamed the Women’s Rights Movement for misleading women into thinking that “the 
240  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 35.
241  RepoRt of the South Dakota taSk foRce to StuDy aboRtion, supra note 1, at 4.
242  Both South Dakota and Missouri have resolved this problem by requiring that women be informed that 
an abortion will “terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living being.” mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.027.1(2) 
(2017); S.D. coDifieD LaWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2017). The Missouri law requires that this statement be 
included in the printed materials provided by the Department of Health and Human Services that a physician 
must provide to woman prior to performing an abortion.
243  Pritchett, supra note 70, at 471.
244  Infantiphobia and Infanticide, supra note 88, at 212.
245  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 75.
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noblest purposes of their being as alike a disaster and disgrace.”246 Accordingly, the abortion-
minded, married woman was regarded as laboring under the false belief that “she should 
be a man, and that her physical organism, which is constituted by Nature to bear and rear 
offspring, should be left in abeyance.”247 So viewed, consent to abortion was effectively 
dismissed as the product of a false messiah who deluded women into the view that they 
were “born for higher and nobler purposes than the propagation of [the] species.”248  
 Moving forward in time, Reardon and others in the antiabortion movement who have 
likewise mobilized around the claim that abortion “seriously hurt[s] women,”249 likewise 
challenge the ability of a woman to authorize a procedure that demands she “defy her very 
nature as a mother to protect her child.”250 As explained by the South Dakota Task Force, it 
“expects far too much of the mother” to expect her to “implicate herself in the killing of her 
own child,” as this act is outside the parameters of her “normal conduct.”251 Another way to 
look at this is that, in consenting to abortion, a woman would also be authorizing her own 
destruction since, as Reardon vividly puts it, it is “impossible to rip a child from the womb 
of a mother without tearing out a part of the woman herself—a part of her heart, a part of 
her joy, a part of her maternity.”252 
Accordingly, if not based in ignorance, consent is typically viewed as the result of 
third-party coercion. It may be at the hands of the “abortionist,” who encourages her to 
defy her nature, perhaps because, as Reardon asserts he stands to profit from the practice 
or is “focused on creating the perfect society through population control.”253 Or it may be 
a male partner or parent who pressures a woman into “accepting an unwanted ‘safe and 
legal’ abortion because it will be ‘best for everyone.’”254 Reinforcing this view, Reardon 
246  StoReR, iS it i?, supra note 92, at 112.
247  Pallen, supra note 97, at 205.
248  Storer, Two Frequent Causes of Uterine Disease, supra note 50, at 198.
249  See, e.g., Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 15; Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 
15, at 1023–29; feminiStS foR Life, supra note 208; opeRation outcRy, supra note 208.
250  RepoRt of the South Dakota taSk foRce to StuDy aboRtion, supra note 1, at 56.
251  Id. 
252  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at 5.
253  Id. at 29–30.
254  Id. at 34; see also RepoRt of the South Dakota taSk foRce to StuDy aboRtion, supra note 1, at 4–5, 
39. Of course, this discussion is not intended to ignore the possibility some women may indeed feel pressured 
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proclaims that if women were “guaranteed a free and informed choice,” in most instances 
it would naturally lead them to “decide that childbirth is clearly their healthiest choice.”255 
Of course, the view that women lack the decisional capacity or the moral agency to 
make an informed decision about abortion “reflects a gender-stereotyped view of women’s 
nature,”256 which extends both back in time and well beyond this singular act. It invokes 
the discredited regime of protective labor laws which were premised on the view, as the 
Court explained in Muller v. Oregon, that women required “special care that her rights 
may be preserved.”257 A view that, as Justice Ginsburg succinctly put it in her dissenting 
opinion in Gonzales, “reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and the 
Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.”258  
3.  The Emotional Cost of Violating One’s Nature
The last shared theme under consideration is that of the adverse emotional 
consequences that both generations of activists assert flow directly and ineluctably from 
the deliberate disruptions of woman’s divinely ordained maternal nature. As understood by 
the nineteenth-century physicians, this suffering was a form of righteous punishment for 
flouting the injunctions of respectable womanhood. As seen by Storer, this breach of nature 
essentially insured that at some point in her life, the aborting woman would awaken to the 
into terminating a pregnancy, just as some may feel pressured into carrying an unintended pregnancy to term, or 
into having unprotected sex in the first instance. Importantly, however, many public health professionals argue 
that the stress by the antiabortionists on abortion coercion “sidestep[s] the broader issue of domestic and sexual 
violence, which is at the root of coercion . . . be it by trying to force the woman to continue with the pregnancy 
or to abort.” Health Experts Challenge Coerced-Abortion Laws, the ameRican inDepenDent inStitute, 
http://americanindependent.com/217196/health-experts-challenge-coerced-abortion-laws [perma.cc/33C7-ND 
3L]. Regarding the link between what is known as reproductive coercion and intimate partner violence, see Ann 
M. Moore et al., Male Reproductive Control of Women Who Have Experienced Intimate Partner Violence in 
the United States, 70 Soc. Sci. & meD. 1737 (2010); Fact Sheet: Intimate Partner Violence and Reproductive 
Control, pLanneD paRenthooD feD’n of am. (2012), https://www.plannedparenthood.org/uploads/filer_public/
fb/70/fb70f966-e4a2-46e8-900c-9137fed3e636/ipv_and_reproductive_coercion_fact_sheet_2012_final.pdf 
[perma.cc/4XU5-7HMM].
255  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at xiv.
256  Manian, supra note 233, at 225.
257  Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
258  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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reality that she had acted “against God, humanity, and even mere instinct,”259 and would 
accordingly suffer “long and unavailing regrets” that would likely lead to “derangement, 
disaster, or ruin.”260  
Tightly moored to the view that abortion is “inherently harmful,” proponents of 
the pro-woman/pro-life platform place considerable stress on the urgent need to protect 
women from the devastating emotional consequences of abortion despite the fact that the 
overwhelming body of evidence-based research, including that conducted by professional 
organizations such as the American Psychological Association and the Academy of Medical 
Royal Colleges, soundly refutes the assertion that abortion leads to serious psychological 
distress.261 This discrepancy, however, is not surprising if one recognizes that, as claimed 
by Reardon, despair is the inevitable result of breaching God’s ordered creation: 
we must remember that the interests of a mother and her child are 
permanently intertwined. This means that the morality of abortion is built 
right into the psychological effects of abortion. Everyone knows that there 
is no psychological trauma association with the discarding of menses. But 
the discarding of an unborn child’s life?” That . . . is inherently traumatic.262
Cutting to the chase, he thus makes clear that “when we are talking about the psychological 
complications of abortion, we are implicitly taking about the physical and behavioral 
symptoms of a moral problem.”263  
 
259  StoReR, Why not?, supra note 20, at 37.
260  Id. at 49, 37.
261  A detailed discussion of this literature is beyond the scope of this article. For a thoughtful review of major 
studies, see minoRity Staff, SpeciaL inveStiGationS Div., comm. on Gov’t RefoRm, faLSe anD miSLeaDinG 
heaLth infoRmation pRoviDeD by feDeRaLLy funDeD pReGnancy ReSouRce centeRS (2006) (prepared for Rep. 
Harry A. Waxman), http://www.chsourcebook.com/articles/waxman2.pdf [perma.cc/429L-CAAS]. For more 
recent studies, see Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, National Collaborating Center for Mental Health, 
Induced Abortion and Mental Health (2011); Brenda Major et al., Abortion and Mental Health, Evaluating 
the Evidence, 64 am. pSychoL. 863 (2009); bRenDa maJoR et aL., RepoRt of the apa taSk foRce on mentaL 
heaLth anD aboRtion (2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf [perma.cc/
ZN8Q-883Y].
262  ReaRDon, supra note 14, at 10 (emphasis in original).
263  Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
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Departing, however, from the nineteenth-century antiabortion physicians who did 
not seek to disguise the causal link between suffering and the deliberate breach of one’s 
feminine nature, Reardon astutely recognizes that although this link will be immediately 
apparent to pro-life Christians who “rightly anticipate . . . that any advantage gained 
through violation of the moral law is always temporary [and] will invariably be supplanted 
by alienation and suffering,” conversion of the ambivalent majority requires “an alternative 
way of evangelizing.”264 As noted above, he thus argues for the “teaching morality by 
teaching science” in order to appeal to this group’s “self-interest” since one can “expect 
to find compelling evidence” through research that “abortion . . . lead[s] in the end, not to 
happiness and freedom, but to sorrow and enslavement” since acting against God’s moral 
law is always “injurious to our happiness.”265 
CONCLUSION
Circling back to the Roe decision, although the Court clearly repudiated the view that 
women’s holiest duty is to bear children, it did so without any discussion of the fact that 
our nation’s criminal laws were motivated by a fierce desire to compel married women, 
particularly if of “native” stock, to fulfill this divinely ordained obligation. Reasoning 
about the history of these laws as if they were enacted solely to protect prenatal life, the 
Court missed a vital opportunity to explore how they were also, as Siegel puts it, a type of 
“caste legislation,” which constituted “a traditional mode of regulating women’s conduct, 
concerned with compelling them to perform the work that has traditionally defined their 
subordinate social role and status.”266  
We will never know exactly why, once it had decided to engage in an historical 
analysis of the “medical-legal” history of abortion to uncover what that history “reveal[ed] 
about man’s attitudes towards the abortion procedure,” the Roe Court opted to read out 
the gendered and nativist themes that populated the medical profession’s antiabortion 
campaign. Its narrow reading of this history is made even more perplexing by the fact that 
it relied upon the 1871 Report of the AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion to excavate 
the origins of our criminal laws, which, as we have seen, stressed the importance of both of 
264  Id. at 11.
265  Id. Reardon carries out this work through the Elliot Institute, which he founded in 1988 to promote “pro-
woman efforts” through research, education, and advocacy. Our Mission & Ministry: Post-Abortion Research, 
Education, and Advocacy, eLLiot inSt. (June 13, 2017), http://www.afterabortion.org/Resources/ElliotInstitute.
pdf [perma.cc/P39V-HXWK].
266  Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 18, at 351. 
Columbia Journal of Gender and law226 35.2
these themes. It may well be, tracking Greenhouse’s suggestion, that the Court was simply 
not ready to entwine two highly-charged issues within the boundaries of a single decision, 
or it may be that this history seemed immaterial in light of the fact that Texas sought to 
defend its law in the name of the fetus. 
Almost twenty years later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,267 the Court moved closer 
to reasoning about the abortion right within an equality framework, as many feminist 
scholars have urged it to do.268 It both recognized that the ability of women to “participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation [had] been facilitated by their ability 
to control their reproductive lives”269 and made clear that the state’s “vision of the woman’s 
role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture,” 
does not warrant the imposition of motherhood as “the destiny of the woman must be 
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place 
in society.”270Although it is evident that the Casey Court grasped the connection between 
abortion regulation and gender status, nothing in the opinion suggests it was aware that this 
“dominant vision” had been encoded into our criminal abortion laws in order to manage the 
unruly matron. Rather, the Court located this vision generally within the nation’s history 
and culture. 
As the woman-protective approach has spread, the Court’s failure to recognize the 
gendered history of our criminal abortion laws assumes greater importance. Had the Court 
paid closer attention to the reports of the AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion, it would 
have seen that the protection of fetal life was hardly the sole animating force behind the 
physicians’ antiabortion campaign. Even a cursory glance at language in the 1871 Report, 
such as that predicting that a woman who had aborted would end her days as a “withered 
tree, stripped of its foliage” and bereft of the tender affections of her husband, would 
have rendered the narrative arc of gender paternalism that links this past effort with the 
contemporary pro-woman/pro-life agenda far more visible. 
In turn, this awareness of the historic continuity in understanding and purpose that 
unites the nineteenth-century antiabortion physicians and today’s proponents of the pro-
267  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
268  For a detailed discussion of both the evolution and the value of this approach, see Reva B. Siegel, Sex 
Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 
emoRy L.J. 816 (2007).
269  Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56.
270  Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
Columbia Journal of Gender and law 22735.2
woman/pro-life position would have opened a discursive space within which at least one 
additional Justice (most likely Justice Kennedy, author of the majority opinion) might have 
recognized this long arc of gender paternalism. As a result, he might have been persuaded to 
join Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in which she lashes out at the majority’s invocation of regret 
as an “antiabortion shibboleth” that masked long discredited ideas “about women’s place 
in the family and under the Constitution.”271 Of particular relevance here is the discredited 
idea that the “paramount destiny and mission of women are to fufil[l] the noble and benign 
offices of wife and mother”272—an “ancient notion” that both undergirds and connects 
past and present efforts to manage women’s bodies based on a naturalized assumption 
about their fixed and proper place in the universe. In short, had the Roe Court reasoned 
within a gendered paradigm, it would have been clear that the abortion regret narrative 
seeks to press women into motherhood in derogation of the Casey Court’s admonition that 
“the destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her 
spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”273 
271  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 183–85 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
272  Id. at 185 (quoting Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
273  Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
